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INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court's 1996 decision in Seminole Tribe
v. Florida' is a significant watershed in the ongoing development of
United States federalism. Rejecting the view espoused by a plurality
only seven years earlier, the Court held that Article I of the Constitu-
tion does not give Congress the authority to override the states' Elev-
* Professor of Law, University of Louisville School of Law. J.D. 1984, University of Illinois.
I am especially indebted to Professor Ronald Rotunda for his constructive criticism of an earlier
draft.
1. 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
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enth Amendment immunity.2 The Court's new view makes it much
more difficult for Congress to regulate the states. Article I is the con-
stitutional basis for most federal statute law. 3 Although Congress may
still invoke Article I to impose substantive liability on the states, Semi-
nole Tribe forces it to turn to state courts for the actual adjudication of
most lawsuits brought against state defendants.
Seminole Tribe does not completely bar the door to federal court in
lawsuits involving state defendants. The decision leaves untouched a
number of exceptions and limitations to state immunity that the Court
has recognized over the years.4 Moreover, even after Seminole Tribe,
Congress retains a limited capacity to override the Eleventh Amend-
ment. Although it rejected abrogation under Article I, the Seminole
Tribe Court explicitly approved earlier precedent that allows Congress
to abrogate state immunity when legislating under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 5 Other cases suggest that Congress may require states
to waive their immunity as a condition to participating in certain fed-
erally-regulated activities. 6
Even with these exceptions, however, Seminole Tribe raises serious
questions concerning the many existing federal statutes that authorize
lawsuits against states in federal court.7 Intellectual property-which
will be referred to in this Article as "federal market rights" 8-pro-
2. Id. at 1119. In so holding, the majority overruled Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S.
1 (1989), which suggested that Congress could abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity when
acting pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1128.
The Eleventh Amendment provides as follows: "The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit ... commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST.
amend. XI.
3. See U.S. CONST. art. I.
4. The majority opinion in Seminole Tribe itself recognizes some of these, for example, suits
by the federal government against a state, 116 S. Ct. at 1131 n.14, Supreme Court review of state
high court decisions in suits against states, id., and a state's power to waive its immunity, calling
waiver an "unremarkable" proposition. Id. at 1128. Other Supreme Court decisions have recog-
nized additional exceptions and limitations, including suits by one state against another, Colo-
rado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 182 n.9 (1982), and suits against political bodies below the
state level, such as cities, Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280-81
(1977). But see Pennhurst State Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 123-24 (1984) (stating that
immunity does apply to a county when there is a high level of direct state involvement in the
challenged activity). Nothing in the language or logic of Seminole Tribe affects these exceptions.
5. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1128 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 454 (1976)).
6. See infra note 80 and text accompanying notes 81-99.
7. In addition to those discussed in the main body of this Article, examples of federal statutes
that purport to override state immunity include the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 106 (1994),
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d), 203(x), 216 (1994), and the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (1994).
8. The term "intellectual property" is probably more familiar to most readers. However, that
label is misleading, especially in an analysis of the Eleventh Amendment. First, consider the
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vides an excellent example. The federal statutes governing patents,
copyrights, trademarks, and false advertising purport to override the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. 9 Applying the law as it stood
before Seminole Tribe, lower courts upheld some of these abrogation
provisions.10 However, because each statute was enacted pursuant to
a particular Article I power,11 all are of questionable validity after
Seminole Tribe. Lower courts have already begun to face the daunting
adjective "intellectual." Although patents and copyrights are awarded only for innovations,
there is nothing necessarily intellectual about trademarks or the right to prevent false advertis-
ing. A seller can obtain rights in a trademark even though he deliberately copied from someone
else, as long as his use of the mark does not cause confusion, Lanham Act §§ 32, 43(a), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1114, 1125(a) (1994), or "dilute" a famous mark, id. at § 43(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). Use of
the term "intellectual" property may have originated as a way to distinguish the unique rights
created by patents, copyrights, and trademarks from the more familiar rights that exist in
tangibles.
The word "property" is even more objectionable. The concept of property is loaded with a
great deal of baggage. More importantly, because a crucial issue in analyzing the Eleventh
Amendment is whether the item in question qualifies as a "property" right, see infra Part
II.A.L.a, the term intellectual property begs the very question that needs to be addressed.
This Article will use the term "federal market rights" as a collective phrase for patents, copy-
rights, and semiconductor chip protection, as well as trademarks, service marks, collective marks,
certification marks, and the right to prevent false advertising under the Lanham Act. All of
these rights are similar insofar as they allow sellers to protect their competitive positions.
Moreover, for purposes of brevity, this Article will use the terms "copyright" and "trademark"
in a non-technical way. "Copyrights" include not only rights set out in the Copyright Act, 17
U.S.C. §§ 106-20 (1994 & Supp. 1995), but also rights granted by the Semiconductor Chip Act of
1984, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14 (1994). Although the Semiconductor Chip Act is not technically con-
sidered part of the Copyright Act, the rights it provides are sufficiently similar to copyrights to
justify lumping them together for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. "Trademarks" include
not only true trademarks, but also service, collective, and certification marks, all as defined in
Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127. Again, although the rules governing these various types of
marks differ in their particulars, they present the same basic issues insofar as state immunity is
concerned.
Of course, patents, copyrights, trademarks, and the right to prevent false advertising are not
the only federal laws that protect market position. The private right of action in antitrust clearly
provides a similar benefit. Clayton Act §§ 4, 16, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15(a), 26 (1994). However, of the
various federal laws meeting this criterion, only the Patent, Copyright, and Lanham Acts contain
abrogation provisions. See infra note 54 and accompanying text. Therefore, they alone directly
present the problem posed by Seminole Tribe.
9. See infra note 54.
10. See, e.g., Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 59 F.3d 539 (5th Cir. 1995) (Copyright Act), va-
cated sub nom. University of Houston v. Chavez, 116 S. Ct. 1667 (1996); Genentech, Inc. v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Patent Act).
11. The Patent and Copyright Acts relate directly to the "Copyright Clause." U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 8. The Lanham Act, by contrast, represents an exercise of Congress's powers under the
general Commerce Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. As discussed below, however, Congress
invoked other constitutional powers when enacting the abrogation provisions of the Patent and
Lanham Acts. See infra text accompanying note 199.
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task of applying the more rigid Seminole Tribe analysis to the abroga-
tion provisions of the federal market right laws.' 2
The question of state immunity is especially important in patent and
copyright law. In most cases, Seminole Tribe creates a detour instead
of a roadblock. The Eleventh Amendment protects states from the
federal courts, not Congress. Nothing in the Eleventh Amendment
prevents Congress from imposing liability on the states, as long as it
assigns adjudication of that liability to state courts.13 Therefore, with
respect to most federal statutes with abrogation provisions, Seminole
Tribe merely forces plaintiffs to litigate in state court. However, this
option is not currently available in patent and copyright cases because
Congress has given the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction. 14 If the
Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from hearing cases alleging
infringement by a state, the patent or copyright owner has no judicial
remedy against the state whatsoever. Such a result would significantly
limit the federal rights granted by the Patent and Copyright Acts.
Part I of this Article deals with the effect of Seminole Tribe on fed-
eral patent, copyright, trademark, and false advertising claims against
state defendants. 15 A literal application of the Supreme Court's rea-
soning leads to the conclusion that federal courts cannot exercise ju-
risdiction in these cases. However, some federal courts have found
ways around that result. Even before Seminole Tribe, one court sug-
gested that the abrogation provisions of the copyright statute could
12. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F. Supp. 400,
420-28 (D.N.J. 1996), afftd, 131 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 1997); Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ.
of Cal., 939 F. Supp. 639, 642-44 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
13. State courts ordinarily cannot refuse to hear cases brought under federal law. See Howlett
v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990) (holding that state courts cannot invoke sovereign immunity to
dismiss federal claims against a state, at least where it allows its courts to hear similar state-law
claims against a state); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (providing that state courts cannot
refuse to enforce federal claims against private individuals).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994). Jurisdiction in Lanham Act cases, by contrast, is concurrent.
Id.
15. Trademarks and false advertising could arguably be excluded from the analysis. As noted
above, because plaintiffs can always bring such claims in state courts, the practical effect of state
Eleventh Amendment immunity is much less in trademark and false advertising cases. See supra
note 14 and accompanying text. In addition, the law of every state provides a separate and
parallel cause of action for trademark infringement and false advertising. Therefore, trademark
and false advertising plaintiffs will ordinarily have a state-court remedy against the state even if
the Eleventh Amendment applies. If policy considerations affect the Eleventh Amendment,
those considerations may be less influential in trademark and false advertising cases.
Nevertheless, this Article includes trademark and false advertising claims. Although the prac-
tical effects of immunity may differ, each of the four types of federal claims present basically the
same Eleventh Amendment issues. Moreover, even though parallel state claims exist, the
Supreme Court has held that the Eleventh Amendment likewise prevents federal courts from
hearing those claims. Pennhurst State Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
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operate as a congressionally-imposed waiver of state immunity.16 In
addition, two post-Seminole Tribe opinions have indicated that patent
claims fall within the Fourteenth Amendment exception because
those claims in effect require a state to compensate for taking the pat-
ent owner's property. 17 If either of these arguments is valid, Seminole
Tribe may not prevent federal courts from hearing federal market
right claims against state defendants.
Part II of this Article demonstrates that both lines of reasoning are
flawed. First, the Supreme Court actually abandoned the theory of
constructive waiver long before Seminole Tribe. Second, Congress
cannot abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity in order to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment. Although patents, copyrights, and trade-
marks may be Fourteenth Amendment property, 18 state infringement
of that right rarely constitutes a "taking" of that property. Therefore,
because the federal market right statutes extend federal jurisdiction to
all state infringement cases, the majority of which do not involve a
taking, those statutes cannot be justified as exercises of Congress's
Fourteenth Amendment power to regulate takings. Finally, Congress
cannot protect these federal rights as Fourteenth Amendment privi-
leges and immunities.
At the outset, it should be stated that this Article deals only with
the liability of states themselves. The Eleventh Amendment also pro-
vides some protection for state officers acting in their official capaci-
ties. 19 However, because a separate line of cases deals with
Congress's ability to impose liability on state officers,20 the issue of
officer liability for federal market right violations is beyond the scope
of this Article.
16. Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 59 F.3d 539, 546-57 (5th Cir. 1995), vacated sub nom. Uni-
versity of Houston v. Chavez, 116 S. Ct. 1667 (1996).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 55-67.
18. Part II also concludes that false advertising claims are not "property." See infra notes 160-
61 and accompanying text.
19. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 73-74 (1985); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of the
Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 462 (1945) (citing Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900)).
20. The basic principle applicable to state officers is riddled with limitations and exceptions.
See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (setting out the basic officer exception); see also Ken-
tucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985) (allowing suit against officer in individual capacity); Hutto
v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (allowing award of attorneys' fees when incidental to prospective
equitable relief); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (allowing suit for prospective equitable
relief when alleging a violation of federal or constitutional restrictions).
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I. SEMINOLE TRIBE AND FEDERAL MARKET RIGHT CLAIMS
Seminole Tribe did not directly deal with federal market right
laws.21 Nevertheless, because the decision reshapes much of Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence, it will undoubtedly have an impact on fed-
eral market right claims brought against state defendants. Accord-
ingly, a careful review of the Court's reasoning is crucial.
A. Seminole Tribe
Seminole Tribe dealt with the 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act.22 This statute requires states to negotiate in good faith with In-
dian tribes about certain types of tribal gambling. 23 If a state does not
act in good faith, the Act explicitly gives tribes the right to sue the
state in a federal district court.24 The suit that culminated in the Semi-
nole Tribe decision was an action brought by the Seminole Indian Na-
tion to compel Florida to negotiate a gaming compact. 25
The Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals's dismissal based on Florida's Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity.26 In so doing, the Court declared unconstitutional the provision
of the Act that explicitly gave federal courts jurisdiction to hear suits
against states. 27 The rationale that the Court used in reaching this
conclusion makes the case a landmark in Eleventh Amendment law.
21. The Court's more recent decisions have also failed to deal with the issue. The Court de-
clined an opportunity to explore the issue of federal market right laws in Regents of the Univer-
sity of California v. Doe, 117 S. Ct. 900 (1997). In that case, the plaintiff sued the University of
California in federal court after it refused to honor its agreement to hire him as a researcher. Id.
at 902. The plaintiff argued that a prior Ninth Circuit decision, Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 998 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1993), had already established that Congress had abrogated the
University's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Regents, 117 S. Ct. at 902 n.2. The Supreme
Court rejected this argument. Noting that Genentech involved a patent claim, while the instant
case involved a breach of contract, the Court indicated that it had "no occasion to consider
questions of waiver or abrogation of immunity in this case." Id. Of course, this statement does
not resolve the question of whether the Patent Act abrogates immunity for patent infringement
claims.
22. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21 (1994).
23. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A). Because of Indian tribal sovereignty, states have little power to regu-
late on-reservation gambling. See Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832) (providing that
state criminal jurisdiction does not extend to Indian lands). Congress, by contrast, has an almost
plenary power to regulate such gambling. See infra note 33. In the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act, Congress requires tribes to negotiate a compact with the states as a condition to conducting
certain types of gambling. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(c). This provision essentially delegated to the
states a sort of veto power over certain gambling activities. However, Congress also required the
states to act in good faith. Id.
24. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A).
25. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1121 (1996).
26. Id. at 1133.
27. Id.
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Seminole Tribe clearly rejects the compromise position regarding
the Eleventh Amendment that was adopted by a plurality of the Court
only seven years earlier. In the 1989 decision, Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas Co.,28 five Justices concluded that Congress could abrogate the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity when necessary to create an
effective statutory scheme.2 9 Although Union Gas was not the first
decision to allow a congressional abrogation of immunity, it was the
first explicitly to uphold abrogation in a statute passed pursuant to
Article I of the Constitution. Four of the five Justices argued that
abrogation under Article I presented no Eleventh Amendment prob-
lem because the states, by ratifying a Constitution giving Congress
certain powers, had consented to any act of Congress necessary to
carry out those powers, including one giving federal courts the power
to enforce that statute against the states.30
The Seminole Tribe Court could easily have distinguished Union
Gas. First, unlike the abrogation provision discussed in Union Gas,
the jurisdictional provision in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act did
not explicitly deal with the Eleventh Amendment. 31 Second, while
Union Gas dealt with a statute enacted pursuant to the general Com-
merce Clause, 32 the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act was enacted pur-
suant to the "Indian Commerce Clause," a provision that although
situated in the same sentence of the Constitution as the Commerce
Clause, is generally considered a discrete grant of authority.33 Rather
28. 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1128.
29. Id. at 7.
30. Id. at 19-20 (plurality) (Brennan, J.). Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens
agreed on this proposition. Id. at 5.
31. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A) (1994) provides in relevant part:
(A) The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over-
any cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure of a State to
enter into negotiations with the Indian tribe for the purpose of entering into a
Tribal-State compact under paragraph (3) or to conduct such negotiations in good
faith.
Id. Because that provision speaks only in terms of jurisdiction, not abrogation, the Court could
have found that it did not satisfy the "clear statement" test required for Eleventh Amendment
abrogation. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1122 (citing Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501
U.S. 775, 786 (1991)). The provision could logically be interpreted not to abrogate. For exam-
ple, Congress could be saying that the federal courts will have jurisdiction over claims against
states only when immunity does not otherwise exist, for example, when a state waives its immu-
nity. Nevertheless, the Court found that § 2710(d)(7)(A) met the clear statement test for abro-
gation. Id. at 1123-24.
32. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 5.
33. The Commerce Clause, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, provides in its entirety: "The Con-
gress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes." The last phrase is often referred to as the "Indian Com-
merce Clause." See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1119.
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than distinguishing Seminole Tribe on either of these bases, however,
the Court explicitly overturned Union Gas, stating: "The Eleventh
Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article
I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed
upon federal jurisdiction. '34
As Justice Stevens recognized in his dissent, the majority's reason-
ing has immediate implications for many federal statutes.35 It cer-
tainly casts doubt on the statutes governing federal market rights.36
Three main laws are involved: the Lanham Act (which deals with both
trademark and false advertising claims), 37 the Copyright Act,38 and
the Patent Act.39 The Lanham Act stems primarily from Article I's
Commerce Clause,40 which Seminole Tribe explicitly holds cannot
serve as a source of authority for abrogation. 41 The Patent and Copy-
right Acts, by contrast, were created pursuant to the specific power set
forth in the Article I Copyright Clause.4 2 Although the Copyright
Clause was not directly at issue in Seminole Tribe, the Court's reason-
ing clearly applies with equal force to all of Congress's Article I
powers.43
On the other hand, Seminole Tribe does not completely foreclose
congressional attempts to make states answerable in federal court.
Over the years, the Court has developed a number of exceptions and
corollaries to the Eleventh Amendment. 44 Although Seminole Tribe
rejects the most useful of these exceptions, abrogation under Article I,
it does not affect the others. Most of the remaining exceptions are not
likely to play a role in federal market right cases.45 However, two of
34. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1131-32; accord Creative Goldsmiths, Inc. v. Maryland, 119
F.3d 1140, 1145 (4th Cir. 1997).
35. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1134 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
36. See id.
37. The Lanham Act is set forth in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-127 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
38. The Copyright Act is set forth in 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-803, 1001-101 (1994 & Supp. 1995). A
similar, but technically separate statute, the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17
U.S.C. §§ 901-14, covers "mask works." As indicated above, this Article treats copyright and
semiconductor chip protection as if they were the same. See supra note 8.
39. The Patent Act is set forth in 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
40. S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 1277 (1946).
41. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1132.
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Copyright Clause provides as follows: "The Congress
shall have Power... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discover-
ies." Id.
43. See supra text accompanying note 34.
44. See supra note 4.
45. Although the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to suits brought by the federal govern-
ment, few federal market right claims are filed by one governmental body against another. For a
notable exception, see the Fourth Circuit's recent decision in United States ex rel. Berge v. Board
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the exceptions, abrogation under the Fourteenth Amendment and
constructive waiver, may be available.
B. The Fourteenth Amendment Exception
While rejecting the attempted abrogation before it in Seminole
Tribe, the Court approved of Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,46 a 1976 case that
upheld a congressional abrogation. 47 The majority found Fitzpatrick
clearly distinguishable, because the statute abrogating state immunity
in that case had been enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause. 48 The Seminole Tribe Court reasoned that
the Fourteenth Amendment had worked a fundamental change in the
then-existing balance of federal and state power.49 In so doing, it also
served as a partial repeal of the Eleventh Amendment, giving Con-
gress authority to override the limits of the Eleventh Amendment to
the extent necessary to make the new rights created by the Fourteenth
Amendment fully effective.50
After Seminole Tribe, courts must apply a two-part test to any ques-
tion of abrogation. First, Congress must make its intent to abrogate
unmistakably clear in the language of the applicable statute.51 Sec-
of Trustees, 104 F.3d 1453 (4th Cir. 1997). In this case a scientist, claiming that her work had
been plagiarized by others, brought an action against the offenders and the state university in
federal court. Id. at 1456. The complaint stated both a claim under the federal False Claims
Amendment Act of 1986 ("FCAA"), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (1994), and a state-law conversion of
intellectual property claim. Berge, 104 F.3d at 1456. The court allowed jurisdiction over the
FCAA claim notwithstanding the university's Eleventh Amendment defense. Id. at 1458-59. It
determined that because such a case is actually a suit brought on behalf of the United States
itself, the case falls within the exception for suits brought "by" the federal government. Id. at
1458.
Although Berge allowed federal jurisdiction, the case cannot be used to support federal juris-
diction over federal market right claims. An FCAA claim is not a federal market right claim,
even when the subject of the representation is a patent or other federal market right. Instead,
the claim is based upon misrepresentations that someone makes to the federal government. See
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a).
A second exception to immunity, United States Supreme Court review of state-court deci-
sions, is also unlikely to arise in copyright and patent infringement cases because of the lack of
state-court subject-matter jurisdiction over these cases. However, it could be a factor in trade-
mark and false advertising cases. See supra note 14.
Of course, the other main exception, suits against state officers, could easily prove to be an
issue in federal market right cases. As noted at the outset, however, this Article deals only with
suits against the state itself. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
46. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
47. Id. at 457.
48. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1128 (1996). Fitzpatrick involved Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1994 & Supp. 1995). 427 U.S. at 447.
49. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1125.
50. Id. at 1128.
51. Id. at 1123.
528 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:519
ond, that statute must be enacted pursuant to a constitutional provi-
sion that gives Congress the power to override the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity.52 To date, the only identified source for such
power is section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.53
The first part of the test is clearly satisfied in the case of the federal
market right laws. The Patent, Copyright, and Lanham Acts each
contain an abrogation provision that meets the Court's rigorous "clear
statement" test.54 It is the constitutional basis for these provisions
that presents a potential problem.
52. Id. These requirements were established in Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985).
53. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1125. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
"The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
54. The Patent Act provides:
Any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or
instrumentality of a State acting in his official capacity, shall not be immune, under the
eleventh amendment of the Constitution of the United States or under any other doc-
trine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal court by any person, including any
governmental or nongovernmental entity, for infringement of a patent under § 271, or
for any other violation under this title.
35 U.S.C. § 296(a) (1994).
The Copyright Act contains a similar provision:
Any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or
instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity, shall not be immune,
under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States or under any
other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal Court by any person, includ-
ing any governmental or nongovernmental entity, for a violation of any of the exclusive
rights of a copyright owner provided by §§ 106 through 119, for importing copies of
phonorecords in violation of § 602, or for any other violation under this title.
17 U.S.C. § 511(a) (1994).
The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, which this Article treats as part of the Copyright
Act, see supra note 8, follows the same basic formula:
Any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or
instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity, shall not be immune,
under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States or under any
other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal court by any person, includ-
ing any governmental or nongovernmental entity, for a violation of any of the exclusive
rights of the owner of a mask work under this chapter ... or for any other violation
under this chapter.
17 U.S.C. § 911(g)(1).
Finally, the Lanham Act, which governs both trademarks and the right to prevent false adver-
tising, provides:
Any State, instrumentality of a State or any officer or employee of a State or instru-
mentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity, shall not be immune, under the
Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States or under any other doc-
trine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal court by any person, including any
governmental or nongovernmental entity for any violation under this chapter.
Lanham Act § 40(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (1994).
For a discussion of the legislative history behind these provisions, see infra text accompanying
notes 199-201.
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To date, two courts have had the opportunity to apply Seminole
Tribe's two-part analysis to the Patent Act.55 Each court concluded
that Congress had the power to abrogate under the Fourteenth
Amendment exception. 56 In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board,5 7 the District Court of the
District of New Jersey held that the Eleventh Amendment did not
prevent it from exercising jurisdiction over a patent infringement
claim against a Florida state agency.58 On the issue of congressional
authority, College Savings Bank relied on section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.5 9 It noted that Congress's power to legislate under sec-
tion 5 is not limited to laws intended to enforce the equal protection
guarantee, the provision at issue in Fitzpatrick.60 Rather, Supreme
Court precedent has established that section 5 applies to each of the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees.61 In resolving the Patent Act
claim, the College Savings Bank court relied on the amendment's pro-
None of these provisions have been directly considered by the Supreme Court. However, the
majority opinion in Seminole Tribe suggests that the language of the Copyright Act may not be
sufficient to abrogate state immunity. In a footnote, the Court stated:
[C]ontrary to the implication of Justice STEVENS' conclusion, it has not been widely
thought that the federal antitrust, bankruptcy, or copyright statutes abrogated the
States' sovereign immunity. This Court never has awarded relief against a State under
any of those statutory schemes .... Although the copyright and bankruptcy laws have
existed practically since our nation's inception ... there is no established tradition in
the lower federal courts of allowing enforcement of those federal statutes against the
States.
Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1131-32 n.16 (second emphasis added). Given the clear language of
the Copyright Act's abrogation provision, this dictum is somewhat puzzling, to say the least.
Although there is considerable doubt as to whether Congress has the power to abrogate, it is
clear that it meant to do so in the Copyright Act § 511(a). "
55. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F. Supp. 400,
427 (D.N.J. 1996), affd, 131 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 1997); Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 939 F. Supp. 639, 644 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
56. College Say. Bank, 948 F. Supp. at 427; Genentech, 939 F. Supp. at 644.
57. 948 F. Supp. 400 (D.N.J. 1996).
58. Id. at 427. The claim was based on the Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board's use of a patented method to determine an adequate rate of return on college loans. Id.
at 402.
In addition to the patent claim, the plaintiff also brought a false advertising claim under the
Lanham Act, alleging that the Board made false and misleading representations in promotional
literature. Id. The Third Circuit's affirmance of the district court's decision dealt only with the
Lanham Act claim. See infra text accompanying notes 68-72.
The full case caption includes the United States as a party because the federal government had
intervened in the action. However, the court's discussion of the Eleventh Amendment deals
only with the private claim. Any claim by the government against the state, of course, would not
be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See supra notes 4 and 45.
59. College Say. Bank, 948 F. Supp. at 426.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 421-22. The court relied particularly on Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966),
which held that section 5 is a positive grant of power which authorizes Congress to exercise its
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tection of "property." Citing a number of cases holding that a patent
is a form of property and that infringement of property rights by the
government constitutes a taking, the court upheld the abrogation pro-
vision as a means of ensuring that states pay for any taking.62
Although ultimately determining that federal jurisdiction was not
available, the District Court of the Southern District of Indiana in-
voked the same basic argument in Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of the
University of California.63 Like College Savings Bank, the court con-
cluded that because patent infringement involves a taking of property,
Congress could order states to defend patent infringement claims in
federal court.64 However, Genentech did not deal with patent in-
fringement by a state. Instead, the State held the patent in that case,
and the plaintiff brought a declaratory judgment action in federal
court to construe the scope of that patent.65 The court found that be-
cause the State was not infringing a patent, the case could not involve
any state taking of a property right under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.66 The court accordingly dismissed the case on the basis of Elev-
enth Amendment immunity. 67
If the reasoning Used by the College Savings Bank and Genentech
courts is correct-an issue to be discussed below-states may be sued
in federal court for patent infringement notwithstanding Seminole
Tribe. Whether the same reasoning applies to copyright, trademark,
or false advertising claims, however, is less clear. The only recent de-
cision on point is College Savings Bank. In addition to its patent
claim, the plaintiff in that case brought a claim for false advertising
under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.68 The court concluded that the
discretion in deciding the necessity and nature of legislation to secure the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 651.
62. College Say. Bank, 948 F. Supp. at 422-23.
63. 939 F. Supp. 639, 643 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
64. Id. at 643-44.
65. Id. at 643.
66. Id. Although conceding that the plaintiff arguably had a right to produce the product, the
court concluded that right could not be a property right because it was not exclusive. See id. By
contrast, a patent holder has the exclusive right to use a process or to produce a product with
certain characteristics or design.
The court also considered a separate Fourteenth Amendment property claim. Although the
plaintiff's right to produce was not a property right under the takings clause, it might have been a
sufficient property right for purposes of procedural due process. Id. Even assuming that to be
true, the court concluded that no due process claim existed. Id. at 643-44. Because the state
could only prevent the plaintiff from making the product by bringing a lawsuit, the court con-
cluded the plaintiff would ultimately receive sufficient due process. Id.
67. Id. at 645-46.
68. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 131 F.3d 353, 355
(3d Cir. 1997). The Third Circuit's affirmance in College Savings Bank only discussed the Lan-
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Eleventh Amendment required dismissal.69 Like the Patent Act, the
Lanham Act specifically abrogates state immunity.70 However, the
court held that Congress had no authority to abrogate in a false adver-
tising case.71 Unlike a patent right, the court did not consider the
right to bring a false advertising claim a property right for purposes of
the Fourteenth Amendment.72
No post-Seminole Tribe decisions have directly addressed whether
copyright or trademark claims against states can be heard in a federal
court. On the spectrum of "property" interests, copyrights and trade-
marks lie somewhere between the virtual monopoly of a patent, which
College Savings Bank determined to be property, and false advertis-
ing, which College Savings Bank said was not. Neither of the court's
explanations of what constitutes property provides any meaningful
guideposts for future analysis. However, it is easy to conceive of
courts applying the takings exception in copyright and trademark
cases.73 Courts and commentators regularly apply the label "prop-
erty" to federal market rights.74 Because a state's infringement of a
copyright or trademark reduces the value of the legal right, infringe-
ment could constitute a constitutional deprivation. Therefore, if the
reasoning of College Savings Bank and Genentech is valid, states may
be required to answer in federal court for patent, copyright, and trade-
mark infringement claims.
ham Act claim. As a result, citations to the false advertising discussion refer to the Third Circuit
opinion, while all other citations refer to the district court opinion.
The plaintiff also brought a common-law unfair competition claim. Id. at 355 n.1. Of course,
that common-law claim is not germane to the discussion because there is no issue of congres-
sional abrogation. Id.
69. Id. at 366.
70. See supra note 54.
71. College Sav. Bank, 131 F.3d at 360-62.
72. Id. at 426-27.
73. Abrogation in both trademark and false advertising cases turns on Lanham Act § 40(a), 15
U.S.C. § 1122(a) (1994). See supra note 54. Even though College Savings Bank held that § 40(a)
was insufficient to overcome state immunity in a false advertising case, that ruling is of little
relevance in a trademark case brought under the Lanham Act. College Savings Bank based its
ruling on its conclusion that the right to prevent false advertising is not property. 131 F.3d at
360-62. Trademark infringement, by contrast, involves a particular word or symbol, and there-
fore could be considered a property right. Under the reasoning of College Savings Bank and
Genentech, § 40(a) would be acceptable if it protected a property right from taking by the state.
74. Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 217-18 (1985) (copyright); Williams & Humbert
Ltd. v. W. & H. Trade Marks (Jersey) Ltd., 840 F.2d 72, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (trademarks); Brach
van Houten Holding, Inc. v. Save Brach's Coalition, 856 F. Supp. 472, 476 (N.D. I11. 1994) (trade-
marks); 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 2:14 (4th ed. 1997) (trademarks); Roger E. Meiners & Robert J. Staaf, Patents, Copyrights, and
Trademarks: Property or Monopoly?, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 911, 915-25 (1990) (patents,
copyrights, and trademarks).
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C. Waiver
Reduced to its essentials, the Eleventh Amendment is a restriction
on the jurisdiction of the federal courts.75 Nevertheless, because that
restriction was enacted to protect the states, 76 courts have routinely
honored a state's waiver of Eleventh Amendment protection. 77 Semi-
nole Tribe has no effect on the principle of waiver, as that case deals
exclusively with Congress's power to force states into federal court
against their will. Therefore, if a state waives its Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity by infringing a federal market right, an action in fed-
eral court might be possible.
Of course, extremely few infringement cases will involve an explicit
voluntary waiver by the state. The standard for explicit waiver is quite
strict. A general waiver of sovereign immunity will not suffice; in-
stead, the state must specifically indicate its willingness to be sued in a
federal forum.78 Few states are likely to make such a concession. 79
An explicit waiver is not always required. Some courts have im-
plied a waiver of immunity from state action, typically from the state's
affirmative participation in a federal lawsuit. 80 Admittedly, there is
75. In fact, the language of the amendment makes this clear. See supra note 2. It speaks in
terms of "the judicial power," the same term that is used in Article III.
76. Most agree that the Eleventh Amendment was enacted to overturn the Supreme Court's
decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), which held that the Article III grant
of jurisdiction over "controversies ... between a State and Citizens of another State" operated
to override a state's sovereign immunity. Id. at 425-26; see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct.
1114, 1130 (1996); id. at 1136 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292
U.S. 313, 325 (1934); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890); Martha A. Field, The Eleventh
Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PENN. L. REV. 515, 515
(1977); William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow
Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdic-
tion, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1034 (1983); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh
Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (1988); William P. Marshall, The
Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A Critical Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1372,
1377-78 (1989); John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action
Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1436 (1975). But see Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1148 n.5 (Souter, J.,
dissenting); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinter-
pretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1926-27 (1983).
Although the basic purpose of the amendment is clear, the problem is that no one is sure how
far Congress went in overturning Chisholm. This basic issue underlies most of the debate con-
cerning the reach of the amendment.
77. In Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299 (1990), for example, the
Court found that New Jersey and New York had statutorily waived their Eleventh Amendment
immunity for suits brought against a particular joint agency. Id. at 308-09.
78. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985); Kennecott Copper Corp. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 578-80 (1946).
79. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICrION 407 (2d ed. 1994).
80. Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 574 (1947) (state filed claim in bankruptcy proceed-
ing); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1883) (state intervened in case as claimant against
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some doubt as to whether the theory of implied waiver remains valid
after Seminole Tribe.81 Yet, even assuming that the theory is valid, it
too is unlikely to play much of a role in federal market right cases.
Implied waiver typically occurs when the state asks the court for some
form of relief, such as by filing a counterclaim. 82 Most states that have
been sued in federal market right cases do not seek relief, but simply
defend themselves from the plaintiff's claims. 83
There is, however, a second and even more controversial form of
implied waiver, which is often called "constructive" waiver. Unlike
other types of waiver, constructive waiver turns on some affirmative
act by Congress that requires the state to answer in federal court. The
theory stems from the Supreme Court's 1964 decision, Parden v. Ter-
minal Railway,84 which upheld federal jurisdiction over a Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act claim against the state of Alabama. 85 The Court
rejected the State's Eleventh Amendment defense by concluding that
Congress had conditioned the State's right to operate a railroad on the
fund); In re 995 Fifth Ave. Assoc., 963 F.2d 503, 507 (2d Cir. 1992) (state filed claim in bank-
ruptcy); Garrity v. Sununu, 752 F.2d 727, 738 (11th Cir. 1984) (state participated in consent
decree); Paul N. Howard Co. v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct Sewer Auth., 744 F.2d 880, 886 (1st Cir.
1984) (state made general appearance and filed counterclaim in contract dispute).
However, waiver will be found only if the state files some affirmative claim for relief. Mills
Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278, 1282 n.6 (9th Cir. 1979). Because the Eleventh Amend-
ment relates to subject-matter jurisdiction, it is a defense that can be raised at any point in the
lawsuit. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974). Accordingly, omitting the defense from
the state's answer does not waive its immunity. Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 981-82 (8th
Cir. 1982); Mills Music, 591 F.2d at 1282.
This theory has even been applied in a few post-Seminole Tribe cases involving bankruptcy.
An unsecured creditor who wants to be paid from the bankruptcy estate must file a proof of
claim with the bankruptcy court. Four decisions (two from the same court) have found that a
state that files a proof of claim waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity for counterclaims that
the estate may have against the state, so that the trustee may bring those claims in the federal
bankruptcy court. Koehler v. Iowa College Student Aid Comm'n., 204 B.R. 210, 220-21 (Bankr.
Minn. 1997); Ossen v. Connecticut, 203 B.R. 17, 23 (Bankr. Conn. 1996); Burke v. Georgia, 203
B.R. 493, 497 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996); Headrick v. Georgia, 200 B.R. 963, 968-69 (Bankr. S.D.
Ga. 1996).
81. Some cases suggest that waiver may be effected only by the state constitution or a statute.
Feeney, 495 U.S. at 305-06 ("The Court will give effect to a State's waiver of Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity 'only where stated by the most express language or by such overwhelming impli-
cation from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction."' (quoting
Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 339-40)). Admittedly, this language strongly implies, rather than explicitly
states, that waiver can occur only by legislative action or constitutional amendment. However,
some lower courts have held that state officers, including the attorney general, cannot waive the
state's immunity. See, e.g., Ohio v. Madeline Marie Nursing Homes, 694 F.2d 449, 461 (6th Cir.
1982).
82. See supra note 80.
83. The only exception might be a state that filed a declaratory judgment action in federal
court to obtain a ruling that its actions did not infringe a federal market right.
84. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
85. Id. at 196-98.
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State's waiver of immunity to suit in federal court.86 The State ac-
cordingly waived its immunity when it voluntarily chose to operate the
railroad.87
One pre-Seminole Tribe case suggests that constructive waiver may
apply in federal market right cases. In Chavez v. Arte Publico Press,88
the Fifth Circuit invoked the theory to uphold jurisdiction over copy-
right and trademark claims brought against a state university that had
published a book.89 The court noted that both the Copyright and
Lanham Acts, by providing for jurisdiction over claims against states,
explicitly conditioned a state's ability to engage in publishing activities
on its waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. 90 By voluntarily
choosing to publish the book, the State was powerless to assert the
Eleventh Amendment defense for either federal claim.91
Chavez, however, is extremely weak precedent. The Supreme
Court vacated and remanded the Fifth Circuit's decision in light of
Seminole Tribe.92 Moreover, College Savings Bank, the lone post-
Seminole Tribe case to consider constructive waiver in the context of
federal market right laws, explicitly rejected the argument. 93 In that
case the District Court of the District of New Jersey concluded that
Seminole Tribe prevents Congress from using Article I as the source of
authority for either abrogation or waiver.94
Use of the constructive waiver theory is admittedly problematic. To
this day, Parden itself remains the only case in which the Supreme
Court has actually based a holding on the theory. Soon after its deci-
sion, the Court began to limit and distinguish Parden.95 This string of
cases culminated in Welch v. Texas Department of Highways and Pub-
86. Id. at 192.
87. Id. at 192-93.
88. 59 F.3d 539 (5th Cir. 1995), vacated sub nom. University of Houston v. Chavez, 116 S. Ct.
1667 (1996).
89. The trademark claims involved the defendant's naming of the plaintiff as the selector of
the plays in the book. Id. at 541. Although a name is not a true "trademark," most courts
recognize that false authorship claims are actionable under the general false advertising provi-
sions of the Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994), a provision that is not confined to
trademarks.
The plaintiff also included a state-law right of publicity claim. Chavez, 59 F.3d at 547. The
court allowed the defendant's Eleventh Amendment defense with respect to that claim, noting
that Congress had not passed a law abrogating immunity for state-law claims of this sort. Id.
90. Chavez, 59 F.3d at 546-47.
91. Id.
92. University of Houston v. Chavez, 116 S. Ct. 1667 (1996).
93. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F. Supp. 400,
416 (D.N.J. 1996), af'd, 131 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 1997).
94. Id.
95. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 672 (1974); Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health
& Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 285 (1973).
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lic Transportation,96 where the Court flatly stated that Parden was
overruled to the extent that it was inconsistent with the ruling in
Welch.97
But, these Supreme Court rulings do not necessarily reject construc-
tive waiver as a viable, if limited, exception to the Eleventh Amend-
ment.98 The trick is interpreting Welch and the other cases. At least
two interpretations are possible. First, the theory of abrogation,
which evolved after the Parden decision, may simply have supplanted
constructive waiver.99 From a practical standpoint, there is no real
difference between abrogation and constructive waiver, for under
both a state can be sued in federal court if it engages in the regulated
activity. If this first interpretation of the precedent is correct, Semi-
nole Tribe should apply even if Congress phrases its statute in terms of
state waiver rather than direct abrogation.
The second interpretation, on the other hand, would recognize con-
structive waiver as a distinct and meaningful alternative to abrogation.
The Court's argument in Parden actually consisted of two main parts.
The first was the conclusion that Congress had the power to condition
state involvement in an activity upon the state's waiver of immu-
nity. 100 Second, the Parden Court found such a condition-notwith-
standing the lack of any language in the governing federal statute
dealing with state liability. 10 Most of the Court's later criticism of
Parden actually seems to focus on the second part of the argument.
By allowing for state liability without the "clear statement" required
96. 483 U.S. 468 (1987).
97. Id. at 478.
98. Four years after Welch, the Supreme Court stated that Welch "overrul[ed] that portion of
Parden which pertained only to the Eleventh Amendment." Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys.
Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 204 (1991). However, that discussion in Hilton is dictum. The lawsuit in
Hilton was a Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA") action filed against the state in state
court and had reached the Supreme Court on appeal from the state's highest court. Id. at 200.
The case accordingly presented no Eleventh Amendment questions. All the Court needed to
decide was that Parden correctly concluded that FELA created liability for state government,
not whether Congress had taken the additional step of overriding Eleventh Amendment
immunity.
99. See Creative Goldsmiths, Inc. v. Maryland, 119 F.3d 1140, 1145-46 (4th Cir. 1997).
It is interesting to note that in its 1991 decision in Hilton, the Supreme Court specifically noted
that it decided Parden before it began to recognize the possibility of direct abrogation. Hilton,
502 U.S. at 204. Although this discussion was dictum, see supra note 98, it nevertheless shows
that at least some members of the Court felt that abrogation rather than constructive waiver
represented the "modern" approach to the problem of Congress's power to override immunity.
100. Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
101. Id. at 187-90. The Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1994), provides
merely that "[e]very common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of
the several States ... shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is em-
ployed by such carrier in such commerce." Id.
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by Welch and other Supreme Court cases, 10 2 Parden is inconsistent
with the more recent precedent. Arguably then, Welch overruled
Parden only insofar as Parden did not require a clear statement from
Congress. The actual language that the Court used in Welch supports
this interpretation: "Accordingly, to the extent that Parden v. Termi-
nal Railway . .. is inconsistent with the requirement that an abroga-
tion of Eleventh Amendment immunity by Congress must be
expressed in unmistakably clear language, it is overruled. 10 3
Unlike the first interpretation, this second reading of Welch would
allow Congress to use constructive waiver as long as it clearly stated
its intent to require states to defend cases in federal court.10 4 In es-
sence, Congress could choose between abrogation and constructive
waiver. Moreover, there is at least one important difference between
the two choices. Because Seminole Tribe itself does not mention
whether its rule applies to constructive waiver, 0 5 the key holding of
that case-that Congress may override immunity only when it acts
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment-may not apply to construc-
tive waiver. Therefore, unlike abrogation, Congress may be able to
impose waivers on states even when it acts pursuant to Article 1.106
102. Many Supreme Court cases apply the "clear statement" rule. See Seminole Tribe v. Flor-
ida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1123 (1996); Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 786-88
(1991); Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96, 101-04 (1989);
Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1989); Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S.
58, 65 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1989), overruled by Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1128 (1996); Welch, 483 U.S. at 472-74; Atascadero State Hosp.
v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242-46 (1985); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343-45 (1978).
103. Welch, 483 U.S. at 478.
104. The clear statement in a waiver case would be evaluated by the same standard as in an
abrogation case. Under this standard, Congress need not clearly indicate that it is imposing a
waiver; it need only indicate that it is forcing the state to defend in federal court. See Employees
of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279,
285 (1973).
105. Even the Court's recent remand of Chavez for reconsideration in light of Seminole Tribe,
University of Houston v. Chavez, 116 S. Ct. 1667 (1996), does not necessarily mean that the
Court has determined that the Seminole Tribe limit applies to waiver. Although Chavez admit-
tedly employed the theory of constructive waiver to support copyright jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court did not indicate its reasons for vacating and remanding. Id. at 1667.
106. However, constructive waiver, if it still exists, would be subject to one significant limita-
tion that does not apply to abrogation. In Employees, the Court considered whether states could
be sued in federal court under the Fair Labor Standards Act. 411 U.S. at 280-81. The Court
distinguished Parden based on the type of government activity in the two cases. Id. at 284-85.
While a state could easily have chosen not to operate the for-profit railroad at issue in Parden, it
could not realistically elect to quit providing the basic health and safety services involved in
Employees. Id. at 285. Absent such a choice, the Court refused to imply a state waiver. Id.
Thus, Employees limits constructive waiver to cases where the general activity being regulated is
not a traditional function of government. See id.; accord College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F. Supp. 400, 415-16 (D.N.J. 1996), affd, 131 F.3d 353 (3d
Cir. 1997).
1998] SEMINOLE TRIBE
However, the second interpretation is simply not tenable. A fair
reading of Welch and the other cases discussing Parden inevitably
leads to the conclusion that the Supreme Court has completely aban-
doned the theory of constructive waiver. 10 7 There is a simple reason
why the Court did not mention waiver in Seminole Tribe; namely, that
it considered the doctrine a dead letter. Now that the Supreme Court
has approved of abrogation, even the limited abrogation envisioned
by Seminole Tribe, there is no need for the clumsy legal fiction of con-
structive waiver.108 Although this author is not entirely comfortable
with abrogation, 109 at least-it represents a more direct and honest at-
Viewed in this light, abrogation and constructive waiver could be considered alternatives.
First, the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the power simply to abrogate the immunity.
Second, when the state acts outside the realm of traditional government activities, Congress may
invoke any of its constitutional powers to require the state to answer in federal court under the
doctrine of constructive waiver.
However, in federal market right cases the "traditional functions" limitation would prove to
be a significant limitation on constructive waiver. Most state infringements of federal market
rights arise in connection with the performance of some state function. In College Savings Bank,
for example, the court specifically found that financing student education constituted a tradi-
tional government function. 948 F. Supp. at 416. Both of the other recent cases dealing with
federal market rights and the Eleventh Amendment also deal with state-funded college educa-
tion. Chavez v. Arte Pubico Press, 59 F.3d 539, 540-41, 547 (5th Cir. 1995), vacated sub nom.
University of Houston v. Chavez, 116 S. Ct. 1667 (1996); Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ.
of Cal., 939 F. Supp. 639, 640, 644-45 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
There could conceivably be infringement cases where a state acts outside the traditional realm
of government. For example, a state could build a factory to produce and sell a patented inven-
tion simply because it hopes to make a profit.
107. The Supreme Court in 1991 explicitly stated that Welch overturned all those parts of
Parden that pertained to the Eleventh Amendment. See supra note 98. Although that statement
is dictum for the reasons given in that note, that statement is certainly strong evidence of the
Court's perceptions of the continued validity of Parden.
108. "Constructive waiver" is undoubtedly a convenient legal fiction. As set forth in Parden,
the doctrine did not require any showing that the state realized it was waiving its immunity. 377
U.S. 184, 194-98 (1964). That standard comes nowhere near the standard that the Court has
applied in later cases for waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. See, e.g., Atascadero State
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 n.1 (1985) ("[W]e require an unequivocal indication that the
State intends to consent to federal jurisdiction that otherwise would be barred by the Eleventh
Amendment."). In fact, the Court criticized Parden, stating: "Constructive consent is not a doc-
trine commonly associated with the surrender of constitutional rights, and we see no place for it
here." Id. (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974)).
109. I am convinced that the "diversity interpretation" of the Eleventh Amendment is correct.
Under this view, the Eleventh Amendment does not absolutely prohibit federal courts from
hearing suits by individuals against states. Instead, the amendment bars only those suits where
the federal courts exercise jurisdiction based solely on Article III's grant of jurisdiction over suits
"between a State and Citizens of another State." U.S CONST. art. III. The diversity theory was
most capably argued by Justice Brennan in his plurality opinion in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co., 491 U.S. 1, 13-23 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1128
(1996), and his dissent in Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 258-59.
The Court, however, has proven unwilling to adopt the diversity interpretation, in no small
part because it would require overturning a number of important Supreme Court decisions, in-
cluding the venerable Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 9-21 (1890), which found that the amend-
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tempt to deal with the relevant issues. Constructive waiver is unsup-
portable both in theory and in practice and should be laid to rest once
and for all.' 10
Even if constructive waiver is not an option, abrogation remains a
possibility. Seminole Tribe acknowledges that Congress retains a lim-
ited power to abrogate state immunity to the extent necessary to en-
force the Fourteenth Amendment."' The remainder of this Article
deals with whether the takings restriction or any other provision of the
Fourteenth Amendment allows Congress to force states to defend fed-
eral market right claims in federal court.
II. DOES SEMINOLE TRIBE BAR FEDERAL MARKET RIGHT
CLAIMS?
As discussed above, two courts have already applied the Seminole
Tribe analysis to federal market right claims against states and con-
cluded that the Eleventh Amendment is not a bar to jurisdiction. 1 2
Because these two cases will likely influence others, it is important to
subject the courts' reasoning to careful scrutiny. This Part will revisit
the takings theory employed in these two decisions and show why it is
invalid. In addition, this Part will consider-and likewise reject-an-
other possible basis for abrogation, the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 3
A. The Fourteenth Amendment Takings Argument
In College Savings Bank, the District Court of the District of New
Jersey applied the Fourteenth Amendment exception to sustain fed-
eral jurisdiction over a patent claim against a state agency." 4 The
ment also bars federal question suits brought against a state by a citizen of that state. Because
that view seems unlikely to change in the near future, this Article accepts the Court's current
interpretation of the amendment as the starting point for the analysis.
110. Even the limited theory of constructive waiver-under which Congress could use Article
I to force states to defend in federal court in the few cases where the state is acting in a non-
traditional area-is not defensible. See supra note 106. Seminole Tribe is only the Court's most
recent recognition of the idea that the Eleventh Amendment was meant as a general shield for
the states from the federal courts. The only exceptions that the Court has recognized share the
same basic feature: a strong federal need to have the state answer in federal court. See supra
note 4. The "traditional function" view of constructive waiver, by contrast, focuses on the state's
need for immunity, concluding that the state has no such need when it acts in non-traditional
areas.
111. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1125 (1996).
112. See supra notes 55-67.
113. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
114. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F. Supp.
400, 420-23 (D.N.J. 1996), affd, 131 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 1997).
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District Court of the Southern District of Indiana echoed that argu-
ment in dictum in Genentech.115 Both courts suggested that the abro-
gation provisions represent a congressional attempt to ensure that
states comply with their Fourteenth Amendment obligation to pay for
taking property.116 That argument could easily be extended to claims
under the Copyright and Lanham Acts. If these courts are correct,
the ruling in Seminole Tribe may actually prove to have little impact in
federal market right cases.
However, it is not immediately obvious that the argument can pass
muster. College Savings Bank and Genentech involve a new, and ar-
guably quite different, application of Fourteenth Amendment abroga-
tion than that discussed in Seminole Tribe. When it condoned the
concept of abrogation, Seminole Tribe was considering only the situa-
tion in Fitzpatrick, a case involving a statute enacted pursuant to the
Equal Protection Clause." 7 The patent law, by contrast, has nothing
to do with equal protection. College Savings Bank and Genentech in-
stead relied on the takings provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
to sustain jurisdiction. 118
As a purely technical consideration, the fact that different provi-
sions of the Fourteenth Amendment are involved should not matter.
The Fourteenth Amendment reaches both equal protection and,
through the Due Process Clause, takings. 1 9 Nothing in the language
of Seminole Tribe suggests that the power to abrogate is limited to
equal protection. To the contrary, the opinion suggests that all of the
Fourteenth Amendment's provisions create that power. 120
Nevertheless, the takings theory seems somehow inconsistent with
the spirit of Seminole Tribe. After all, the practical result of the the-
ory is that Congress sometimes can force states to defend cases in fed-
eral court even when the underlying claim is based on a statute
enacted under Article I. Congress need only demonstrate that the
right, although created under Article I, is a property right. That sort
of "bootstrapping" is difficult to square with Seminole Tribe's une-
quivocal rejection of Article I as a basis for abrogation.
115. Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 939 F. Supp. 639, 643 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
116. See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
117. Fitzpatrick involved the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See supra note 48. The Seminole Tribe
Court specifically relied on this statute's Fourteenth Amendment origins in distinguishing Fitz-
patrick from the situation in Seminole Tribe. 116 S. Ct. at 1125, 1128.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 56-67.
119. See College Say. Bank, 948 F. Supp. at 422. Indeed, the Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion Clauses are set forth in the same sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
120. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1128.
19981
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Even though it is admittedly unsettling at first, the takings theory is
consistent with Seminole Tribe. There is no convincing way to distin-
guish abrogation based upon the Equal Protection Clause from abro-
gation under the Takings Clause. Although historically it is clear that
the concept of equal protection was the primary purpose of the Four-
teenth Amendment, it cannot be disputed that protecting private
property from state interference is also an important Fourteenth
Amendment value. If Congress has the power to abrogate to ensure
that states treat people equally, it should also have the power to abro-
gate to prevent state takings. 121
Nor does the takings exception create an unintended legal loophole.
What makes the theory troubling at first is that the underlying prop-
erty right is created under Article I. But that is the nature of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment is not self-con-
tained. It does not itself define the property rights that it protects, but
turns to other sources of law for that definition. 122 Although most
rights are created by state law,123 Congress may also create property
rights when it acts under Article 1.124 As long as Congress's action
creates a true Fourteenth Amendment property right, the Fourteenth
Amendment both prohibits states from taking that right and empow-
ers Congress to regulate those takings. Thus, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment concept of taking, by definition, turns on rights created by other
laws. College Savings Bank and Genentech merely recognize another
consequence of the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of property;
namely, that Congress may also require states to defend takings claims
in federal court.
Finally, the takings exception does not threaten to undermine Semi-
nole Tribe. Although the theory allows Congress to use Article I to
abrogate whenever it creates a property right, most congressional acts
121. What may actually be troubling is the logic of Fitzpatrick itself. The notion that the
Fourteenth Amendment somehow operated sub silentio as a partial repeal of the Eleventh
Amendment is not entirely satisfying. Although the Fourteenth Amendment undoubtedly re-
structured the federal-state relationship, that does not necessarily mean that it changed the allo-
cation of judicial jurisdiction, which is the subject of the Eleventh Amendment. Until the Court
provides greater insight into why the Fourteenth Amendment expands the jurisdiction of federal
courts, there is no way to determine with certainty whether the argument of Fitzpatrick applies
to Fourteenth Amendment provisions other than the Equal Protection Clause.
122. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980) (citing Board of
Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
123. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
124. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980); Shoshone Tribe of
Indians v. United States, 299 U.S. 476 (1937). Both cases hold that tribal interests in land, which
interests are created by the federal government, are "property" for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 407-24; Shoshone Tribe, 299 U.S. at 496-
98.
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do not create property rights within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment's takings restriction. In most federal laws that impose
duties on states, Congress has not created rights in any particular
"thing," but has merely required states to act in a particular way to-
ward individuals. 2 5 For example, the statute in Seminole Tribe itself,
which gave Indian tribes the power to force states to negotiate, did not
create a property right in the tribes. In addition, even those few laws
that do create property rights do not necessarily deal with state tak-
ings of that property.12 6 Consider Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., the
case that Seminole Tribe overturned. 2 7 Although the right to indem-
nity in Union Gas almost certainly was a property right, the State's act
of negligently causing damage would not qualify as a constitutional
taking.'2 8 Because most laws enacted under Article I do not regulate
takings, the takings theory is not likely to save most Article I abroga-
tion provisions from the rule of Seminole Tribe.129
125. See infra note 129. It is important to distinguish two distinct components of Fourteenth
Amendment due process. In addition to requiring compensation for state takings of property,
the Fourteenth Amendment requires the state to provide certain procedural safeguards when-
ever it deprives people of their property rights. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see Paul v. Davis, 424
U.S. 693, 710-11 (1976). However, the term "property" does not mean the same thing in these
two contexts. The category of property rights that require notice and a hearing is much larger
than the category of property that the state must pay to take away. See Bishop v. Wood, 426
U.S. 341, 350 (1976) (procedural due process). The Bishop Court held that because the plaintiff
could be fired from his position only upon a showing of cause, the state had to provide a
pretermination hearing. Id. at 349-50. However, assuming that cause existed, the state would
not be required to provide compensation to plaintiff for firing him. Id. at 346-47, 350.
126. The Due Process Clause also applies to "liberty" interests. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Liberty interests certainly qualify for the Fourteenth Amendment's procedural safeguards.
However, they can be taken without any compensation. The Supreme Court has never applied
the takings restriction of the Fourteenth Amendment to liberty. The reasons for this distinction
become clearer when one considers that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Fifth
Amendment. The Fifth Amendment has two distinct provisions: a "due process" clause, which
applies to life, liberty, and property, and a "takings" clause, which applies only to private prop-
erty. U.S. CONST amend. V; United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987); United States v.
General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945).
The Eleventh Amendment question presented in this Article would be very different if the
Fourteenth Amendment required compensation for deprivations of liberty interests. Although
few federal laws that apply to the states create property rights, many, including those discussed
in the text, may create liberty rights.
127. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe v. Flor-
ida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
128. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-32 (1986) (holding that negligent deprivations
of property do not violate the Due Process Clause).
129. Of course, some federal abrogation statutes may be justified by other provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment. For example, several federal statutes forbid states from discriminating
against certain groups. To the extent that such laws emanate from the "equal protection" re-
quirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, Fitzpatrick allows Congress to abrogate the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity. See, e.g., Timmer v. Michigan Dep't of Commerce, 104 F.3d
833, 838-42 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994), to be based on
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Although the underlying theory in College Savings Bank and
Genentech is valid, there is also some question about whether the
courts correctly applied it to federal market right laws. Seminole Tribe
allows abrogation only when Congress actually acts "pursuant to a
valid exercise of power.' 130 Of course, that case also indicates that the
Fourteenth Amendment is a valid source. Nevertheless, it is not
facially obvious that federal market right laws deal with actual consti-
tutional takings. Answering that question requires an analysis of both
the principles defining a constitutional taking and Congress's power
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to regulate state
takings.
1. Federal Market Right Violations as Takings
The most fundamental issue is whether infringement and false ad-
vertising actually involve a Fourteenth Amendment taking. Federal
market right cases exhibit several unique features that make this a
difficult question. Unlike typical takings cases, which involve land or
chattels, federal market right cases deal with rights in intangibles. In
addition, the government does not "take away" those rights in the
same sense that it does when it condemns an easement or seizes an
automobile.
Notwithstanding these conceptual hurdles, the district court opin-
ions in College Savings Bank and Genentech quickly concluded that
patent infringement, at least, does constitute a taking. 131 These courts
certainly had the benefit of precedent. Two Supreme Court cases,
James v. Campbell132 and Hollister v. Benedict & Burnham Manufac-
turing Co.,133 explicitly state that government infringement of a patent
constitutes a taking. 134 Although both cases were decided in the
the Equal Protection Clause, so Congress may abrogate immunity); Autio v. Minnesota, 968 F.
Supp. 1366, 1368 (D. Minn. 1997) (reaching the same conclusion regarding the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (1994)).
130. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1123 (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)).
Seminole Tribe also requires that Congress "unequivocally" express its intent to abrogate. Id.
The Patent, Copyright, and Lanham Acts easily meet this second requirement. See supra text
accompanying note 54.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 55-67.
132. 104 U.S. 356 (1881).
133. 113 U.S. 59 (1885).
134. Id. at 67-68; James, 104 U.S. at 358-59. The discussion in both cases is arguably dicta.
Although the Court explicitly stated in both cases that government infringement was a taking, it
went on to rule that neither invention was sufficiently original to qualify for patent protection.
Hollister, 113 U.S. at 67, 73; James, 104 U.S. at 358, 382.
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1880s, neither has been seriously questioned. Indeed, dicta in several
other Supreme Court cases actually supports their holdings.1 35
Both the district court and the Third Circuit opinions in College
Savings Bank also considered false advertising claims under Lanham
Act § 43(a). 136 They each concluded that, in contrast to a patent, false
advertising does not involve a taking.1 37 Because the right to control
false statements does not qualify as a property right, the courts deter-
mined that the State's advertising could not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment, even if it was false.' 38
Unfortunately, College Savings Bank and Genentech applied an
overly simple analysis to the difficult question of whether federal mar-
ket right violations involve a taking. Reliance on nineteenth-century
Supreme Court precedent in this area is certainly questionable, be-
cause the Supreme Court's analysis of takings problems has evolved a
great deal over the past century. The lower courts should have con-
sidered the Supreme Court's more recent opinions to determine
whether federal market right infringements involve constitutional
takings.
A taking comprises four elements: a constitutionally recognized
property interest, a taking of that interest by some branch of govern-
ment, a public use, and a lack of adequate compensation. 139 The third
element, that the taking be for a public use, will be satisfied in all
federal market right cases, as the Court has indicated that the concept
of a public use is "coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police
powers.' 40 It can also be assumed for the sake of this discussion that
the last element will always be satisfied in federal market right cases,
for the ordinary plaintiff will not sue if the state has already provided
135. See, e.g., William Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine Bldg. Co. v. International Curtis Marine
Turbine Co., 246 U.S. 28, 37-43 (1918) (finding, based upon the concept of condemnation, that a
1910 federal statute, currently found at 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1994), required the federal government
to compensate the patentee for using his invention); Crozier v. Friederich Krupp Aktiengesell-
Schaft, 224 U.S. 290, 303-07 (1912) (finding the same); see also Cammeyer v. Newton, 94 U.S.
225, 234-35 (1877) (rejecting the defendant's argument that because he was a government em-
ployee, he could not be held liable for infringing a patent; however, it was not clear that the
Court relied on the Takings Clause as a basis for the decision).
136. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F. Supp.
400, 426 (D.N.J. 1996), affd, 131 F.3d 353, 366 (3d Cir. 1997).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1000-01 (1984).
140. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984); see also Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26, 33-35 (1954) (deferring to Congress's authority to take land for more sanitary purposes).
As long as the taking is rationally related to a "conceivable public purpose," the Court will find
the public use requirement satisfied. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240-41.
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adequate compensation. Thus, the other two elements will control in
a federal market rights case.
a. Intellectual "Property"
As noted above, the first element of a taking is a constitutionally
recognized property interest. 141  The Fourteenth Amendment pre-
vents states from taking property.142 One can easily find a wealth of
cases and commentaries concluding that the patent, copyright, and
trademark laws create property. 43 However, most of these discus-
sions are largely irrelevant. The label "property" is a conclusion, not
an analysis. A finding that something is property under the tax laws,
for example, merely means that something exhibits certain features
that cause the tax laws to treat it differently than they treat non-prop-
erty. Whether that same item is property for other purposes, such as
an estate, a bankruptcy, or a condemnation, is a different question
altogether.1 44
The relevant issue is what the takings clause means by the term
"property." Supreme Court precedent, although admittedly not pre-
cise, does provide a working definition. 45 As already stated, it is clear
that property is created by laws other than the Constitution itself. 146
Moreover, the focus is not on the "thing" itself, but instead on the
bundle of legal rights that laws create in that thing. 147 A court must
consider the characteristics of that bundle of rights to determine
whether the bundle constitutes property. 48 Not all legal rights are of
equal importance in this calculus. The Court's analysis emphasizes
141. See supra text accompanying note 139.
142. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Actually, the Fourteenth Amendment does not explicitly re-
quire states to pay compensation for taking property. Nevertheless, courts have found a duty to
compensate in the Fourteenth Amendment's general requirement of "due process." See Webb's
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-39 (1897).
143. See supra note 74.
144. The Supreme Court itself clearly recognizes that the definition of property varies accord-
ing to the substantive legal right involved. In Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985), the
Court held that infringement of a copyright does not constitute any of the property crimes of
theft, conversion, or fraud. Id. at 217-18. In this context, the Court noted: "While one may
colloquially link infringement with some general notion of wrongful appropriation, infringement
plainly implicates a more complex set of property interests than does run-of-the-mill theft, con-
version, or fraud." Id.
145. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
147. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) (discussing the "bundle of rights" anal-
ogy); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945) (discussing the same).
148. General Motors, 323 U.S. at 377-78.
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the rights to possess, use, and dispose of the item.149 The overriding
theme is exclusivity.150 Accordingly, a rough definition of property for
purposes of the takings restriction could simply be: an identifiable
thing in which a person has a legally-protected expectation of exclu-
sive possession and use.
Patents, copyrights, and trademarks satisfy this definition. All three
involve a distinct, albeit intangible, thing.' 51 Patent rights exist in dis-
crete, identifiable inventions. Copyright protection presupposes that
the individual has created a physical expression of a given idea. Simi-
larly, trademark rights exist in words, symbols, or configurations. 152
149. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002-03 (1984) (citing General Motors, 323
U.S. at 377-78).
150. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 (1980) (citing Kaiser Atena v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979)) (calling the right to exclude a "fundamental element" of
Fourteenth Amendment property).
Exclusivity is an important part of the right to dispose. The right to dispose is of no value if
the individual cannot exclude others from possession and use.
151. The typical takings case involves land or some other form of tangible property. Because
patents, copyrights, trademarks, and the right to be free from false statements are all intangible,
they present a more difficult question. Although the Court has occasionally suggested that the
thing must be tangible, other cases make it clear that intangible property is also protected. Com-
pare General Motors, 323 U.S. at 377-78 (discussing property rights only in terms of a person's
relation to a physical thing), with Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1002-04 (trade secrets), Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 41 (1960) (materialman's lien), Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v.
Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 564 (1935) (real estate lien), and Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571,
579 (1934) (insurance contract).
152. It is a basic tenet of trademark law that trademark rights exist only in connection with the
goodwill associated with the owner's business operation. United Drug Co. v. Theodore
Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) ("There is no such thing as property in a trademark except
as a right appurtenant to an established business or trade in connection with which the mark is
employed."); Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916) ("The redress that is
accorded in trade-mark cases is based upon the party's right to be protected in the good-will of a
trade or business."); 1 JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 1.03[2] (Jef-
frey M. Samuels ed., 1997); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 74, § 2:15. The law protects trademarks
not because of their own innate merit, but in order to make sure that owners reap the fruits of
the goodwill that they have generated. S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946). The test for infringe-
ment of a trademark reflects this principle. Use of someone's trademark is actionable only if
that use is likely to cause confusion as to the source of the goods being sold. Lanham Act §§ 32,
43(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a) (1994).
Notwithstanding the close relationship between trademarks and goodwill, this Article will
treat the mark, rather than the goodwill, as the "res" for purposes of analyzing the question of
whether trademarks are property. As noted, a key feature of Fourteenth Amendment property
is exclusivity. See supra note 150. Although a trademark owner has the exclusive right to use a
given word, symbol, or configuration (at least in a certain market), he has no exclusive right to
goodwill. Competition, by its very nature, involves an effort by competitors to appropriate part
of that goodwill. Generally, as long as the competitor does not deceive consumers or act in an
egregious manner, no action will lie for appropriation, of a competitor's goodwill.
In fact, there is some question whether goodwill is property for purposes of eminent domain
law. Two older Supreme Court cases hold that mere competition by the state does not "take"
the property of a private firm. Seattle Gas Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 638, 638-39 (1934); Puget
Sound Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 619, 626 (1934). More recent decisions stress that loss of future
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In addition, although the scope of protection differs significantly,
the owner of a patent, trademark, or copyright also has a justified ex-
pectation of exclusive possession and use; an expectation which fed-
eral law protects. A patent is the simplest case, for the patent laws
allow the owner to stop anyone from producing a product with the
same basic characteristics as the protected invention.153 Trademark
law also involves exclusivity, although not to the same extent. Admit-
tedly, the owner of a trademark cannot stop anyone from using the
same mark. The law only forbids others from using the mark when
that use would result in customer confusion. 154 Nevertheless, because
confusion will occur if someone uses that mark on the same or similar
products in the market where that party does business, the trademark
owner does have an exclusive right in the market where it sells its
wares.155
A copyright is the most difficult case.156 Unlike patent and trade-
mark law, copyright law does not give the copyright holder a truly
exclusive right to the work. The holder of the copyright can only pre-
vent others from copying or distributing the original work. 157 In-
dependent creation of an identical work, although unlikely, is not
profits does not ordinarily support a takings claim. See, e.g., Andrus, 444 U.S. at 66 (calling
future profits a "slender reed" on which to base a takings claim); California State Auto. Ass'n
Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Maloney, 341 U.S. 105, 108-11 (1951) (stating that expected losses do not
amount to a taking). One prominent commentator on the subject agrees. 8A PATRICK J.
ROHAN & MELVIN A. RESKIN, NICHoLs ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 29.02[1] (rev. 3d ed. 1997).
Treating the mark rather than the underlying goodwill as the "res" supports the conclusion
that a trademark is property for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment takings restriction. The
mark is property; the value of which is measured by the goodwill associated with the mark.
Moreover, because owners do have exclusive use of their marks, they have for all practical pur-
poses an exclusive right in that portion of the goodwill that is wrapped up in the mark.
153. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994). The Patent Act provides that anyone who "without authority
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States" has in-
fringed the patent. Id.
154. Lanham Act §§ 32, 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1114, 1125(a). As of January 1, 1996, the Lanham
Act also allows the owner of a famous mark to obtain an injunction against acts that might
"dilute" that mark. Id. § 43(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). Unlike ordinary infringement, a party suing
for dilution need not demonstrate likelihood of confusion, at least in theory. This additional
right strengthens the conclusion that famous trademarks are a form of property.
155. Id. § 33, 15 U.S.C. § 1115. Owners who register their marks with the Patent and Trade-
mark Office technically have nationwide, rather than local, rights. Id. However, many courts
will not allow a trademark owner who does not do business in a given market to recover against
a competitor who uses the mark only in that market, under the theory that no actual customer
confusion can possibly exist in such a case. The leading case is Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food
Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 365 (2d Cir. 1959).
156. The discussion of copyright also applies to semiconductor mask works under the Semi-
conductor Chip Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. § 901-14 (1994). See supra note 8.
157. The copyright holder has not only the right to prevent copying, but also has the exclusive
right to prepare "derivative works," to distribute the work, to perform and display literary, musi-
cal, choreographic and similar works, and to perform sound recordings by digital audio transmis-
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actionable. Therefore, the copyright holder has no legal guarantee
that he or she will be the only person in the market selling the work.
A copyright should nevertheless qualify as property for purposes of
condemnation. 158  Copyright does protect an identifiable thing,
namely, the fruits of one's own intellectual labors set forth in a partic-
ular medium of expression. Although the inventive activities of others
may result in highly similar or even identical works, the copyright
owner justifiably expects to be the only person who can reap the fruits
of his or her own tangible creation. 159
On the other hand, the court in College Savings Bank correctly con-
cluded that false advertising does not involve a property right.1 60
False advertising law does not create even a modicum of exclusivity.
Even if the plaintiff's right to challenge the defendant's false assertion
is a discrete "thing," that right is not exclusive. Other competitors,
consumers, and state and federal agencies may also be able to bring an
action challenging the false statement. 16' Accordingly, the College
Savings Bank court correctly concluded that Congress cannot invoke
sion. 17 U.S.C. § 106. In addition, § 106A provides limited rights of attribution and integrity in
certain works of visual art. Id. § 106A.
158. Accord Roth v. Pritikin, 710 F.2d 934, 939 (2d Cir. 1983) (dictum).
159. Supreme Court precedent reinforces the conclusion that a copyright is property for pur-
poses of the Fourteenth Amendment takings restriction. In Ruckelshauv v. Monsanto Co., 467
U.S. 986 (1984), the Court held that a trade secret qualified as property for purposes of the
Takings Clause. Id. at 1001-04. Like copyright law, trade secret law does not impose liability on
someone who independently creates the same information. It does, however, prevent copying.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 1 (amended 1985); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION § 40 (1995). Because trade secret law and copyright law are logical parallels, the Ruckel-
shaus Court's conclusion that a trade secret is Fourteenth Amendment property should also
apply to copyrights.
Although trade secrets are undoubtedly a form of "intellectual property," they are not in-
cluded in this Article because they do not qualify as a federal market right. There is no federal
law imposing civil liability for infringing a trade secret.
160. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F. Supp.
400, 427 (D.N.J. 1996), affd, 131 F.3d 353 (3d. Cir. 1997).
161. Of course, not all false advertising cases under § 43(a) are the same. The typical case
involves a defendant who makes false claims about its own product. Any one of a defendant's
competitors may invoke § 43(a) to sue in this sort of case. In "disparagement" cases, by contrast,
a defendant makes a false statement about one particular competitor. Because § 43(a) is limited
to plaintiffs who can demonstrate that they are "likely to be injured," only the competitor who is
mentioned in the statement has the right to bring suit for disparagement. See Lanham Act
§ 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994).
However, even disparagement cases do not involve an exclusive right. Admittedly, the plain-
tiff is the only party who can sue under § 43(a). But parties other than competitors may also
challenge the defendant's acts. A consumer who shuns the goods of the seller mentioned in the
statement for the misrepresenting seller's goods may sue for misrepresentation. Similarly, the
Federal Trade Commission or state officials may have the authority to challenge the action. See
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994).
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its power to regulate takings as a means to abrogate state immunity in
false advertising cases.
b. Infringement as a Taking of Property
As just demonstrated, patents, copyrights, and trademarks (but not
the right to prevent false advertising) are property rights for purposes
of the Fourteenth Amendment takings analysis. The second element
of that analysis is whether government infringement of these rights
involves a taking. There is certainly no taking in the literal sense.
Government infringement of a patent, copyright, or trademark never
involves an actual transfer of rights from the individual to either the
government or a third party.162 The state does not-indeed, it per-
haps cannot-take over the owner's federal market rights.' 63 Thus,
the owner retains its right to prosecute all other parties who infringe
the exclusive right. The owner also remains free to use and sell the
underlying invention, work, or symbol. 64
Nevertheless, the due process concept of taking is not limited to
cases where a government actually appropriates individual property
rights. The Supreme Court has also found a taking when the govern-
ment intentionally interferes with an owner's use or enjoyment of pri-
vate property. 165 Whether a particular interference is a taking
depends on the circumstances of each case. In recent years the Court
has developed a general analysis to be applied in all takings cases.
This analysis includes three factors: (i) the nature of the government
action, (ii) the economic impact of that action on the owner, and (iii)
the degree to which the action interferes with reasonable investment-
backed expectations. 66
162. Ruckelshaus is one example of a case in which the Court found that the government
"took" property by requiring the owner to transfer it to a third party. 467 U.S. at 1013.
163. Although the issue has never been litigated, the federal patent and copyright laws would
almost certainly preempt a state law that actually purported to transfer the exclusive federal
rights to the state. Such a statute would directly contravene the allocation of rights set out in
those statutes. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994) (copyright preemption); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989) (patent preemption). Whether the Lanham Act would
preempt a state's attempt to usurp trademark rights is less clear. Unlike the Patent and Copy-
right Acts, the Lanham Act incorporates and builds upon existing state law, and accordingly has
little preemptive effect.
164. Of course, government does not itself acquire any exclusive right in an invention, work,
or mark by infringing.
165. See supra note 128.
166. Concrete Pipe & Products v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 643, 645
(1993); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1071 (1992) (quoting PruneYard
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980)); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475
U.S. 211, 225 (1986); Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1005 (quoting PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 83).
Although the Court often states that these three factors are not exclusive, they are the only
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The first factor, the nature of the government action, allows a re-
viewing court to characterize the type of taking involved. The typical
case fits one of two molds: (i) a government appropriation or physical
invasion of property,167 or (ii) a government regulation of the use or
transfer of that property. 168 The result of this initial categorization
controls the remainder of the analysis. Physical invasion or appropria-
tion is a per se taking, regardless of the degree of injury to the
owner. 169 In regulation cases, however, a court must also evaluate the
other two factors.
One encounters an immediate problem in trying to apply this first
factor to federal market right cases, for infringement does not really
fit in either of the two standard categories. There is certainly no phys-
ical invasion or appropriation of any of the owner's rights. As noted
above, the owner retains an unfettered right to use and to prevent
others from using the invention, work, or symbol.170
Moreover, infringement is also markedly different than regulation.
In a regulation case, the government has enacted a law of general ap-
plicability that happens to injure one or more people. In an infringe-
ment case, by contrast, the government has "singled out" the owner to
shoulder the entire burden of the government action. Common sense
dictates that such singling out should be relevant to the analysis in
some way. The Court has stated the purpose of the condemnation
clause in quite broad terms, namely "to bar Government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.' 171 At least one
older Supreme Court case, along with more recent lower court cases
and scholarly discussion, suggest that singling out makes a stronger
case for a taking. 72 Unfortunately, as there is no recent precedent
factors the Court ever actually considers. See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 643, 645 (stating that
these factors are of "particular significance").
167. See United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951) (seizure of coal mines); Inter-
national Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399 (1931) (water rights).
168. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
(1987) (ordinance barring construction in floodplain); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (re-
striction on transfer of Indian relics).
169. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436-37 (1982) (re-
quiring property owners to allow installation of television cables on their property constitutes a
taking, even though only a de minimis portion of property is actually involved); see generally 2
RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15:12 (1992 &
Supp. 1997) (describing two types of government action that constitute per se takings).
170. See supra text accompanying note 164.
171. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
172. In Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914), the government had con-
structed a railway tunnel near the owner's land. Id. at 548-50. A mechanical exhaust system
blew smoke and dirt from this tunnel onto the owner's land. Id. at 549-50. Although the Court
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discussing the question, it is not entirely clear whether the Court con-
siders singling out to be relevant to the takings analysis.
Assuming that singling out is relevant, the best spot to fit it into the
three-part analysis is the first factor. In some respects, singling out
makes infringement cases look more like physical invasion or appro-
priation cases, where the government likewise singles out one per-
son.173 However, because infringement cases do not involve any
government usurpation of property rights, it is extremely unlikely that
the Court would consider infringement a per se taking. Thus, a court
would also need to consider the remaining two factors.
One possible approach to singling out cases would be to consider
the second and third factors-economic impact on the owner and de-
gree of interference with reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions-but to require less of the owner under those factors than would
be necessary in a pure regulation case. In the case of a general regula-
tion, the owner can recover only if the government regulation destroys
almost the entire value of the property.174 An owner who is singled
out, by contrast, should be entitled to recover even if the property
retains some residual value. 175
did not allow the owner to recover for the general inconvenience, it did allow the owner to
recover for the special harm caused by the exhaust, noting that the government had singled out
the owner for this treatment. Id. at 556-57.
More recent lower court cases also suggest that singling out is relevant. See, e.g., Florida Rock
Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (reinforcing the need to consider
whether government unnecessarily imposes a burden on less than all individuals for benefits
enjoyed by all). Professors Rotunda and Nowak apparently agree. 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK,
supra note 169, § 15:12.
173. In fact, every physical invasion and appropriation case by definition involves an act spe-
cifically directed at one person. However, because these cases are per se takings, the Court has
not had occasion to consider whether singling out, standing alone, is relevant.
174. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), the Court held that a
regulation qualified as a taking when it "denies all economically beneficial or productive use of
land." Id. at 1015-16.
The specific reference to "land" in the above quote has raised some question as to whether
regulation of other property can ever constitute a taking. Id. at 1018. However, the specific
choice of words seems to have been inadvertent. Later regulation cases have applied the three-
part analysis to interests other than land. See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Construction
Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 643-45 (1993) (evaluating the plaintiff's burden in a case
involving a pension plan contract).
175. Another line of Supreme Court cases supports the approach to singling out cases sug-
gested in the text. The Court has occasionally had to determine whether flights over property,
either of aircraft or projectiles, constitute a taking. See Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84,
88-90 (1962) (aircrafts); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261-64 (1946) (aircrafts); Ports-
mouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 250 U.S. 1, 2 (1919) (artillery shells); see also
Brown v. United States, 73 F.3d 1100, 1104-06 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (aircrafts). Although arguably a
physical invasion, the Court has refused to treat such cases as per se takings because of the
limited right of exclusivity in airspace. See Causby, 328 U.S. at 261. Rather, the Court also
considers the effect of the overflights on the value of the property, finding a taking only when
SEMINOLE TRIBE
This approach can readily be applied to federal market right cases.
With respect to the second factor, infringement undoubtedly has an
economic impact on the value of the federal market right. At the very
least, the state has deprived the owner of one sale of the invention,
work, or symbol. Moreover, the owner satisfies the third factor, a jus-
tified economic expectation of receiving those profits, because the
Patent, Copyright, and Lanham Acts give the owner limited monopoly
rights against even the states.' 76 Government infringement undoubt-
edly reduces total profit, which is the best measure of the economic
value of the invention, work, or symbol. 177
The Supreme Court's decision in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.17 8
supports this conclusion. Ruckelshaus held that a federal licensing
program that required a company to disclose its trade secrets consti-
tuted a taking.' 79 It noted that the company had a justified expecta-
tion of exclusivity in some of the secret information, and that the
federal law requiring public disclosure would deprive the company of
most of the value of that information. 180 The government was there-
fore required to compensate the owner for that loss in value, even
though the information was still worth something to the owner.' 81
But the reduction in value that inevitably occurs when a patent,
copyright, or trademark is infringed does not automatically transform
all-or even most-state infringements into Fourteenth Amendment
takings. Because infringement involves neither an appropriation nor
a physical invasion, it is a taking only if it deprives the owner of most
of the value of that property.1 82 Most government infringements of a
the government takes away most of that value. See Griggs, 369 U.S. at 88-90; Causby, 328 U.S. at
262; see also Brown, 73 F.3d at 1102 (appellate decision). Although these cases are admittedly
not directly on point-the Court nowhere, for example, indicates that singling out is important-
they do indicate that courts must consider the economic effect of the government's acts even in
cases where those acts affect only one person.
176. Again, this Article does not question Congress's power to impose liability on states for
infringement of federal market rights. It only questions its power to assign adjudication of in-
fringement cases to federal court.
177. Although "property" constitutes the bundle of rights in a thing rather than the thing
itself, one should focus on the entire thing when calculating value. Of course, the bundle of
rights that a person has in a thing determines the value.
178. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
179. Id. at 1003-04. The Court's opinion actually broke the analysis into different periods of
time. Id. at 1010-11. For much of the time, the Court held that the owner had no justified
expectation of exclusivity, so that mandatory disclosure was not a taking. Id. at 1005-10, 1013.
However, during the period in which that expectation existed, the government-ordered disclo-
sure constituted a taking. Id. at 1010-14.
180. Id. at 1010-12.
181. Id.
182. Admittedly, there is language in Supreme Court opinions suggesting that a reduction in
value, standing alone, can never constitute a taking, regardless of the magnitude. See, e.g., Con-
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patent, copyright, or trademark simply will not have that great an ef-
fect on the value of the underlying invention, work, or symbol. Again,
the owner retains the right to use, and the even more important right
to prevent others from using, the item. 183 All the government really
has taken is a non-exclusive license to use the item. Although that
license has a value, it may not be that great a percentage of the total
value of the invention, work, or symbol.
Moreover, the situation in Ruckelshaus is easily distinguishable
from a typical infringement case. As the Court in that case noted,
losing the secrecy of a trade secret results in a tremendous decrease in
the value of the information.184 More importantly, because trade se-
cret rights disappear once the information becomes public knowledge,
loss of secrecy also results in a loss of legal protection.185 Therefore,
even though the company in Ruckelshaus could still use the informa-
tion for its own purposes, the government action caused the company
to lose the practical ability to sell that information to anyone, not just
the state. 186 The net effect was a loss of virtually all of the informa-
tion's value.187
The early Supreme Court cases dealing with patent infringement
can also be distinguished from more typical federal market cases using
this same reasoning. James 88 and Hollister189 are somewhat unique.
James involved a device for stamping the postmark on letters, 190 while
the invention in Hollister was a tax revenue stamp.' 9' Both of these
inventions are notable in that they could be used only by the federal
crete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993)
("[O]ur cases have long established that mere diminution in the value of property, however
serious, is insufficient to demonstrate a taking."). However, those statements cannot be read out
of context. The third factor of the Court's takings analysis asks whether the owner had a justi-
fied investment-backed expectation that it would reap that value. Id. Unless the law gives the
owner some sort of exclusive right in the profits attributable to that property, the mere fact that
the government decreases the value of the property is not enough to rise to the level of a taking.
Thus, for example, the government can regulate use of property that would constitute a nui-
sance. Although that regulation decreases the value of the property, the owner had no justified
expectation of being able to use the property in that manner. Id.
183. See supra text accompanying note 162-64.
184. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1011-12.
185. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995). Civil liability for trade
secret misappropriation is largely a creature of state common and statutory law. See UNIF.
TRADE SECRETS ACT (amended 1985); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
(1995); see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 1839 (West Supp. 1997) (federal criminal trade secret provision).
186. See supra note 185.
187. See supra note 185.
188. 104 U.S. 356 (1881).
189. 113 U.S. 59 (1885).
190. James, 104 U.S. at 357-60.
191. Hollister, 113 U.S. at 59-61.
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government.192 When the federal government copied the inventions
without compensation, it deprived the patentees of virtually the entire
market value of the patents. 193
Applying all three factors of the analysis, then, leads to the conclu-
sion that government infringement of a federal market right will con-
stitute a taking in only two situations. The first is a case like James or
Hollister, where the infringing state is the sole, or one of a very few,
potential buyers of the product. If the state is free to copy, the value
to the owner of the invention, work, or symbol will be substantially
reduced. Cases of this sort are rare, however, when state governments
are involved. Most inventions and works can be used by parties other
than government. Moreover, even if the invention or work can be
used only by government, infringement by only one state would not
deprive the owner of most of the value, because other states might still
purchase the item.194
The second type of case in which a taking may occur is one in which
the state competes with the owner in selling the product. 195 Now the
owner has been deprived not only of the revenue that the state should
have paid, but also the revenue from sales to other private parties.
That lost revenue may well represent a sizable percentage of the total
value of the federal market right. Again, however, such cases are un-
likely to arise very often.196
In conclusion, then, the takings exception is of limited use in federal
market right cases. Because most inventions and works of authorship
can be sold to buyers other than the infringing state, patent and copy-
192. Id. at 67; James, 104 U.S. at 358.
193. Cammeyer v. Newton, 94 U.S. 225 (1877), which discusses the issue in dictum, involved a
similar situation. Id. at 227. The invention in that case was a device for removing obstructions
from rivers. Id. Because rivers are public waterways, the main value of that invention derived
from the ability to market it to the government. Id. at 227-28.
194. Of course, if enough states infringe the patent, copyright, or trademark, at some point the
effect on value will be sufficient to constitute a taking. If, however, the invention or work is
designed for the idiosyncratic needs of one state, infringement by that state may be sufficient.
195. In takings cases involving the federal government, the Court of Claims apparently recog-
nizes a "proprietary" exception. Gratz v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 411, 420 (1992); Sun Oil Co. v.
United States, 215 Ct. Cl. 716, 770 (1978). "A taking can occur only when the Government acts
in its sovereign capacity." Gratz, 25 Cl. Ct. at 420. When government causes injury while acting
as a proprietor, recovery must be through breach of contract. Id. Although this distinction, if
valid and applicable to state takings, might be relevant in some infringement cases, this Article
will ignore it for purposes of simplicity.
196. Note, however, that this reasoning will transform a number of trademark infringements
into takings. Unlike patent and copyright infringement, trademark infringement occurs only
when the defendant presents a mark to consumers in a way that is likely to cause confusion. See
Lanham Act §§ 32, 43(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a) (1994). If the state uses the mark in a way
that causes such confusion, the value of the owner's mark as an indication of source is likely to
be substantially reduced.
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right infringements do not necessarily constitute a taking. And even if
the state competes with the owner, there may well be many cases in
which that competition does not appreciably diminish the value of the
goodwill represented by plaintiff's trademark. In the many cases in
which the value of the invention, work, or symbol is not substantially
affected, Congress has no power to open the doors of the federal
courts to the owner.
2. The Fourteenth Amendment Takings Restriction as a Basis for
Federal Market Right Laws
The prior discussion demonstrates that only a handful of patent,
copyright, and trademark cases involve constitutional takings. As a
result, Congress could use the Fourteenth Amendment exception to
force the states to defend at least these few cases in federal court.
Whether Congress can achieve that goal under the current legislation,
however, is not clear. In addition to the underlying violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Seminole Tribe requires proof that Congress
acted "pursuant to" the Fourteenth Amendment when enacting the
abrogation provision in question. 197 This standard makes it necessary
to trace the roots of each of the abrogation statutes.
a. The Need to Invoke the Fourteenth Amendment
One potential problem with the Court's "pursuant to" standard is
that many federal statutes can be supported by more than one source
of federal legislative power. Consider the Fourteenth Amendment.
Congress's powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment fre-
quently overlap its Article I powers.198 It is not entirely obvious
whether an abrogation provision is valid merely because it could be
grounded in section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, or whether
Congress must explicitly invoke that provision when enacting the
statute.
Fortunately, this issue does not arise under the patent and trade-
mark laws, for the legislative history of both statutes' abrogation pro-
visions explicitly mentions the Fourteenth Amendment.199 The
197. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1124 (1996).
198. Several federal statutes, for example the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994), prohibit discrimination in the workplace. Those laws can arguably be
justified either as an exercise of Congress's power to regulate commerce, or its power to prevent
discrimination.
199. Although Congress cited only the patent power of the Copyright Clause when enacting
the main body of the patent law, it enacted the abrogation provision, 35 U.S.C. § 296 (1994),
separately in 1992. The legislative history behind the amendment specifically lists the Four-
teenth Amendment as a basis for the statute. PATENT AND PLANT VARIETY PROTECrION REM-
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question is more difficult in copyright cases. Congress dealt with state
Eleventh Amendment immunity in copyright cases by a special
amendment to the Copyright Act. 200 The legislative history for this
amendment mentions only the Article I Copyright Clause as its consti-
tutional basis.201 Therefore, regardless of whether Congress might
have relied on the Fourteenth Amendment, the legislative history
does not clearly indicate that it intended to do so.
Given the Supreme Court's insistence on legislative precision when-
ever questions of abrogation are concerned, 202 Congress's failure to
cite the Fourteenth Amendment might mean that the abrogation pro-
vision of the Copyright Act is invalid. The case law to date is mixed.
EDY CLARIFICATION ACT, S. REP. No. 102-280, at 8 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087,
3094.
The Lanham Act has a similar history. Congress added Lanham Act § 40, 115 U.S.C. § 1122
(1994), the abrogation provision, during the same term as it amended the Patent Act. The Sen-
ate issued a single report dealing with both abrogation provisions. PATENT AND PLANT VARIETY
PROTECTION REMEDY CLARIFICATION ACT, S. REP. No. 102-280, at 8 (1992). Significantly, the
committee's discussion of how the Fourteenth Amendment can serve as a basis for the abroga-
tion applies to both the Patent and Lanham Acts. The operative language reads:
[T]he bill is justified as an acceptable method of enforcing the provisions of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The court in Lemelson v. Ampex Corp. recognized that a patent is
a form of property, holding that a right to compensation exists for patent infringement.
Additionally, because courts have continually recognized patent rights as property, the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from depriving a person of property without
due process of law. The same holds true in the area of trademarks. Furthermore, the
Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the authority to enforce this right. S. 758 and
S. 759 represent a valid extension of Congress' right to protect the property rights of
patent and trademark holders.
Id. (emphasis added). This citation to the Fourteenth Amendment is especially telling when one
considers that the Patent and Lanham Act amendments were enacted after Union Gas, where
the Supreme Court strongly intimated that Article I alone would be sufficient for abrogation.
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S.
Ct. 1114, 1128 (1996).
The Lanham Act provisions also apply to false advertising claims. However, as the above
discussion shows, false advertising does not constitute a taking of property. Thus, Congress
could not invoke the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for making states answer in federal court
for false advertising.
200. Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 101-553, 104 Stat. 2749 (1990) (codified
in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). That amendment also involved the Semiconductor Chip Pro-
tection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14 (1994), which, although part of the same title as the
Copyright Act, is technically distinct. The 1990 amendment produced not only § 511 of the
Copyright Act, but also § 911 of the Semiconductor Chip Act. The two provisions are virtually
identical. See supra note 54. As indicated, this Article lumps copyright and semiconductor chip
protection together for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment analysis. See supra note 8.
201. The main components of the legislative history are H.R. REP. No. 101-282, at 3-11
(1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3949; S. REP. No. 101-305, at 4-13 (1990). The Copyright
Clause is set forth in U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
202. For example, when evaluating an abrogation statute, the Court requires a "clear legisla-
tive statement" showing the intent to abrogate. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatok, 501 U.S.
775, 786 (1991).
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The Fourth Circuit recently refused to consider whether the abroga-
tion provision of the Bankruptcy Code might be justified as an exer-
cise of section 5 power absent any indication by Congress that it had
intended to rely on that power.20 3 On the other hand, the Sixth Cir-
cuit and the District of Minnesota have upheld abrogation provisions
that could have been promulgated under the Fourteenth Amendment
without such an explicit reference.20 4 If the "potential power" argu-
ment of these latter decisions is correct, the abrogation provision of
the Copyright Act could be valid.
b. The Extent to Which the Infringement Provisions Protect
Fourteenth Amendment Values
Whenever state infringement of a patent, copyright, or trademark
results in a taking, Congress has the power to force the state to defend
the infringement suit in federal court, notwithstanding the Eleventh
Amendment. Congress has not, however, confined the abrogation of
state immunity to those cases actually involving a taking. Instead, the
governing statutes abrogate immunity in all patent, copyright, and
trademark infringement cases.20 5 This broad override goes far beyond
that necessary to regulate state takings of federal market rights. Of
course, this overinclusiveness is not necessarily fatal. A court could
simply limit the abrogation provisions to situations where the state
action constituted a taking. In the majority of cases where no taking
was present, the court would simply dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in City of Boerne v. Flores,20 6
however, strongly suggests that a court would find the Patent, Copy-
right, and Lanham Act's abrogation provisions to be void in toto.
Boerne dealt with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, a federal
statute intended to limit government interference with certain relig-
iously-motivated practices.207 Congress cited the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as the sole basis for the law.20 8 Because an earlier Supreme
Court decision had held that these sorts of practices were not constitu-
203. Creative Goldsmiths, Inc. v. Maryland, 119 F.3d 1140, 1146 (4th Cir. 1997).
204. Timmer v. Michigan Dep't of Commerce, 104 F.3d 833, 838 (6th Cir. 1997) (Equal Pay
Act); Autio v. Minnesota, 968 F. Supp. 1366, 1372 (D. Minn. 1997) (Americans with Disabilities
Act).
205. See supra note 54.
206. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
207. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994). The Court
found the statute unconstitutional in Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2172.
208. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2162.
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tionally protected, 20 9 however, the Court held in Boerne that Congress
could not use the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent the states from
regulating them.210 The Court held that section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment allows Congress to provide remedies for actual constitu-
tional deprivations, but not to create entirely new rights. 21' There-
fore, even though it recognized that some of the practices covered by
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act might fall within the First
Amendment, the Court struck down the statute in its entirety. 212
At first glance, Boerne seems to be easily distinguishable from the
Fourteenth Amendment issue dealt with in this Article. Boerne dealt
with the scope of Congress's legislative power to create substantive
rights. In that instance, Congress was attempting to negate Supreme
Court precedent by extending protection to activities that the Court
had already held were not protected by the First Amendment. By
contrast, an underlying constitutional violation-a Fourteenth
Amendment taking-may already be present when a state infringes.
Unlike Boerne, then, Congress is not creating a new right in federal
market right cases. In fact, Congress is not even using the Fourteenth
Amendment to create a new remedy for violation of that right. Con-
gress needs the Fourteenth Amendment in federal market right cases
only because it wants to use the federal courts to adjudicate that
remedy.
Nevertheless, Boerne does affect the issue at hand. At its core, that
case is about the scope of Congress's powers under the Fourteenth
Amendment. It is important to note that the Court did not limit Con-
gress's section 5 powers to providing remedies for independent consti-
tutional violations. Rather, the Court explicitly mentioned that
Congress may enact legislation that reaches activities not protected by
the Constitution.213 The Court also indicated, however, that such
overinclusive legislation would be valid only if there was "a congru-
ence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or reme-
died and the means adopted to that end. ' 214 The statute in Boerne,
which extended protection to a broad array of religious practices not
209. Oregon Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). The Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act was clearly enacted to reverse the result in Smith. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at
2160.
210. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2171.
211. Id. at 2168-78.
212. Id. at 2171-72.
213. Id. at 2163.
214. Id. at 2164.
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covered by the Constitution, did not meet this congruent and propor-
tional test.2 15
The Court also distinguished the federal civil rights statutes, which
similarly extend protection to discrimination not barred by the Consti-
tution.2 16 The Court found that Congress could point to a long history
of discrimination on the basis of race.217 Because of this history, the
Court was willing to afford Congress more latitude in drafting a law
that was congruent and proportional to the problem it needed to
solve. 218 No such history existed, however, for the sorts of religious
practices involved in Boerne.219
This part of the Boerne analysis is therefore directly relevant to the
question of abrogation. After Seminole Tribe, an abrogation provision
is valid under the Fourteenth Amendment exception if it can be sup-
ported entirely by section 5. Boerne construes section 5 to allow Con-
gress to enact only legislation that is congruent and proportional to
some independent constitutional violation.220 Therefore, if the abro-
gation provisions are significantly overinclusive, they exceed Con-
gress's section 5 powers.
The abrogation provisions of the Patent, Copyright, and Lanham
Acts fail this standard. These provisions purport to abrogate immu-
nity for all state infringements. As discussed in detail above, however,
only a very few state infringements will result in enough of a decrease
in the value of the invention, work, or symbol to constitute a constitu-
tional taking.22' Nor is there any documented large-scale problem of
states refusing to honor federal market rights, a fact that would give
Congress more flexibility. Therefore, extending federal jurisdiction to
all infringement cases is clearly overkill.
Second, the remedial provisions of the federal market right laws go
well beyond providing a remedy for a taking. Remedies under the
Patent, Copyright, and Lanham Acts are not limited to damages and
injunctions. The Copyright Act authorizes statutory damages. 222 The
Lanham and Patent Acts both allow treble damages. 223 If Seminole
215. Id.
216. Id. at 2169-70.
217. Id. at 2169.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 2170.
220. Id.
221. See supra Part II.A.l.b.
222. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1994). Section 504(c) authorizes statutory damages of from $500 to
$20,000 for each infringement, or in the case of a willful infringement, up to $100,000. Id. The
copyright owner must elect statutory damages in lieu of actual damages. Id.
223. Lanham Act § 35, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1994); Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994).
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Tribe allows Congress to abrogate only when necessary to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment restriction on government takings, these aug-
mented damages should not be available in an action brought against
a state defendant in federal court. A federal court should have the
power to award only ordinary damages, which represent the value of
what was taken.224 Augmented or statutory damages, which go be-
yond compensation for the taking, would be available only in the state
courts.
In conclusion, courts should entirely reject the takings exception in
federal market right cases brought against the states. Even though a
few infringements may involve a taking, the current legislation, which
reaches all infringements and overcompensates the owners, is in no
way congruent and proportional to any constitutional problem that
may exist. Accordingly, Boerne indicates that the abrogation provi-
sions cannot be justified under Congress's section 5 power to regulate
state takings.
B. An Alternate Theory: Privileges and Immunities
The takings exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity is
grounded in the general notion that the Fourteenth Amendment oper-
ates as a partial repeal of the Eleventh Amendment. 225 Therefore,
even if the takings exception is not valid, other provisions of the Four-
teenth Amendment might support abrogation of state immunity in
suits arising under federal market right laws. Although Fitzpatrick
recognizes that the Equal Protection Clause can support abroga-
tion, 226 infringement of a federal market right presents no equal pro-
tection concerns. Of the remaining Fourteenth Amendment
protections, the most likely candidate to support an abrogation is the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of section 1.227
To date, no court has applied this argument to a federal market
right claim. However, two decisions of the Bankruptcy Court of the
Southern District of Georgia conclude that because the right to bank-
ruptcy relief involves a privilege or immunity under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Bankruptcy Code's explicit override of state Elev-
enth Amendment immunity is a constitutionally proper abrogation. 228
224. This amount would include a reasonable royalty, as provided in the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.
§ 284.
225. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1125 (1996).
226. See supra text accompanying note 48.
227. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States." Id.
228. See Burke v. Georgia, 203 B.R. 493 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996); Headrick v. Georgia, 200
B.R. 963 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996). Both decisions were written by Chief Judge John S. Dalis.
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If valid, this argument might well apply to at least some of the fed-
eral market right laws. The Privileges and Immunities Clause applies
to national, rather than state rights.229 Patents and copyrights are
clearly national, because they can be bestowed only by Congress.
Similarly, although state law can and does create trademark rights, the
Lanham Act supplements those basic rights in several ways, including
the all-important federal claim for infringement.230 Even a Lanham
Act false advertising claim might be considered a national "privilege"
that qualifies for protection under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause.
Applying the privileges and immunities argument to federal market
right cases, however, is unlikely to overcome state immunity. Com-
pared to its Fourth Amendment counterpart,231 the Fourteenth
Amendment Privileges and Immunities Clause is extremely limited.
Several Supreme Court decisions have limited the concept of privi-
leges and immunities to uniquely national rights, including the rights
to engage in interstate travel and commerce, to petition Congress, to
vote in federal elections, to enter upon federal public lands, and to
exercise certain rights while in the custody of federal officers.232
Measured by this yardstick, federal market rights would not qualify
as a Fourteenth Amendment privilege.233 Notwithstanding their fed-
eral origin, federal market rights are not of the same genre as the priv-
ileges identified by the Court over the years. Those privileges all
involve issues that are unique to a federal system of government such
as the United States. The right to free travel and commerce among
Burke, 203 B.R. at 493; Headrick, 200 B.R. at 963. In Headrick, the court also held in the alter-
native that the state had waived its immunity by filing a proof of claim against the debtor's
estate. 200 B.R. at 968.
229. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 7 (1944).
230. Lanham Act § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994). The Lanham Act also augments the basic
trademark rights by giving registrants nationwide rights, id. § 33(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a); and
after five years of registration, the additional advantages of incontestability. Id. § 33(b), 15
U.S.C. § 33(b).
231. "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens
in the several States." U.S. CoN.sT. art. IV, § 2. The Article IV Privileges and Immunities
Clause has enjoyed a sort of renaissance in recent years. However, because it predates the Elev-
enth Amendment, the Article IV clause cannot serve as a basis for abrogation of state immunity.
232. See, e.g., Snowden, 321 U.S. at 1 (Privileges and Immunities Clause); Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (right against self-incrimination); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270
(1900) (right to travel); Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U.S. 657 (1893) (taxation of liquor); The Slaugh-
ter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (right to contract).
233. Admittedly, Reeves v. Corning, 51 F. 774 (C.C. Ind. 1892), can be read for the proposi-
tion that a patent is a privilege for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment privileges and immu-
nities clause. Reeves, however, is of very limited value as precedent. In addition to the age of
the case, the court's discussion of whether a patent is a privilege is merely dictum, because the
court found that the state regulation of the patent was reasonable. Id. at 780.
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the states is a crucial element of United States federalism. The re-
maining privileges all fall within the Fourteenth Amendment because
of the importance of ensuring that the federal government retains a
status separate and independent from the states. Federal market
rights, by contrast, have nothing to do with a federal system, as evi-
denced by the fact that many non-federal nations grant similar
protection.
Moreover, even if a federal market right could be considered a
Fourteenth Amendment privilege or immunity, infringement of that
right by a state would not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. First,
as a technical matter, infringement may not even present a privileges
and immunities problem. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that
a state may not "make or enforce any law" that deprives anyone of
their privileges or immunities. 234 Because a state infringes a federal
market right by making or using an invention, work, or symbol, rather
than by the enactment of a law, most infringements do not violate the
clause.
Second, the Privileges and Immunities Clause is not absolute.
Although states cannot entirely take away protected privileges, they
can impose reasonable limitations on the enjoyment of those privi-
leges.235 In fact, the precedent suggests that the standard is quite
lax.2 36 State infringement of a patent, copyright, or trademark would
almost certainly constitute a reasonable imposition on the federal
right. As discussed above with respect to the takings exception, the
state limits neither the owner's use nor the owner's right to prevent
others from using the invention, work, or symbol.2 37 State infringe-
ment merely decreases the economic value of the federal market right.
In addition, the infringing state in no way discriminates for or against
residents of that state, another factor that is important to the privi-
leges and immunities question.238
Accordingly, like the takings restriction, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Privileges and Immunities Clause gives Congress no power to
abrogate state Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal market
right cases. Although that clause may support abrogation in other
234. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
235. 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 169, § 14.3.
236. The Supreme Court has on only one occasion found that a state limitation violated the
privileges and immunities clause. In Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935), the Court found
that a state income-tax scheme that discriminated between the income from loans to residents
and loans to non-residents violated the privileges and immunities clause. The Court explicitly
overturned Colgate only five years later in Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940).
237. See supra text accompanying note 164.
238. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554 (1876).
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types of cases, state infringement of a federal market right simply does
not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause.2 39 Absent that
threshold violation, Congress cannot use its exceptional Fourteenth
Amendment powers to force the states to defend infringement claims
in federal court.
III. CONCLUSION
In his dissent in Seminole Tribe, Justice Stevens predicted that the
majority's new rule limiting abrogation of state immunity would have
serious consequences for many federal statutes.240 Among the stat-
utes he listed were the Patent and Copyright Acts. 241 Because these
statutes stem from Congress's Article I powers instead of the Four-
teenth Amendment, Justice Stevens felt that Seminole Tribe rendered
the abrogation provisions invalid.242
Justice Stevens's fears are well founded. As currently written, the
abrogation provisions of not only the Patent and Copyright Acts, but
also the Lanham Act governing trademarks and false advertising,
could not survive a challenge under Seminole Tribe. Although Semi-
nole Tribe is not an absolute bar to federal jurisdiction over claims
against states, none of the exceptions are available. Contrary to the
suggestion of two recent district court opinions, the abrogation provi-
sions cannot be sustained as a regulation of states' taking of intellec-
tual property, because the statutes are not confined to the few
infringements that actually qualify as takings. The constructive waiver
and privileges and immunities exceptions are likewise unavailable.
The conclusion that the Eleventh Amendment bars federal jurisdic-
tion is especially troubling in the area of patent and copyright law.
Because Congress has given the federal district courts exclusive juris-
diction over patent and copyright infringement cases, Seminole Tribe
means that no court is available to hear claims against state defend-
ants. In essence, this means that states are currently immune from the
patent and copyright laws. Although this may be welcome news for
state governments, it poses a threat to the patent and copyright
systems.
239. The analysis in the text also leads to the conclusion that the bankruptcy court decisions in
Burke v. Georgia, 203 B.R. 493 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996), and Headrick v. Georgia, 200 B.R. 963
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996), are incorrect in concluding that the privileges and immunities clause
supports abrogation of state immunity in bankruptcy. Even if bankruptcy does qualify as a privi-
lege, the state action in those cases did not entirely take away the exercise of that privilege.
240. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1134 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
241. Id.
242. Id.
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Of course, it is important to remember that the problem is fairly
easy to solve. No constitutional amendment is needed. The Eleventh
Amendment only limits Congress's power to assign matters to the fed-
eral courts. Nothing in Seminole Tribe or other Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence affects the substantive liability that Congress has im-
posed on the states under the Patent, Copyright, and Lanham Acts.
Plaintiffs are already free to bring Lanham Act claims against state
defendants in state courts.243 And with a simple stroke of a pen, Con-
gress could give state courts jurisdiction in patent and copyright cases
involving state defendants.244 Although granting jurisdiction to state
courts might upset Congress's goal of a uniform interpretation of the
patent and copyright laws, that need for uniformity cannot prevail
over the clear command of the Constitution. Moreover, because the
Eleventh Amendment does not bar the United States Supreme Court
from reviewing state-court decisions in cases involving state defend-
ants, some degree of uniformity could be maintained.
It would even be possible for Congress to allocate some patent,
copyright, and trademark infringement cases against state defendants
to the federal courts. All three of these federal market rights are spe-
cies of property for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although most infringements do not rise to the level of a taking of
that property, the state action will in some cases reduce the value of
the federal right to such a degree that it will constitute a taking. Pro-
vided that it substantially reworked the jurisdictional statutes and the
remedies provisions, Congress could abrogate state immunity in this
handful of cases.2 45
For the time being, however, a federal forum is unavailable in any
federal market right cases. This situation is unlikely to be acceptable
for long; after all, the influential research and entertainment industries
have considerable financial interests at stake. Therefore, a quick leg-
islative response is likely. Assuming that response considers the issues
discussed in this Article, it should pass constitutional muster.
243. Jurisdiction over a state defendant need not be confined to the courts of that state. In
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979), the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment provided no
immunity to a state being sued in the courts of a sister state. Id. at 416.
244. Congress could accomplish its goal simply by amending the provision creating patent,
copyright, and trademark jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1994), to make that jurisdiction concur-
rent in cases brought against states. This approach would provide a state-court remedy in most
infringement cases, while preserving the option of a federal court in cases where the state waived
its immunity.
245. One easy solution would be for Congress to write a general jurisdictional statute giving
federal courts jurisdiction over all claims against state defendants in which the alleged state
action constituted a taking.
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